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Chapter 1 Introduction
This thesis studies the recent developments in the Russian banking sector. In particular, we
look at issues related to the introduction of deposit insurance, the role of state- and foreign-owned
banks and some aspects of prudential supervision related to systemic stability.
Russia's deposit insurance (DI) legislation, which reached the statute books at the end of 2003,
is perhaps the most important banking reform adopted in recent years. The system is intended
to strengthen banking sector stability, to protect retail savers, to enhance competition and to
foster nancial deepening by mobilizing the large volume of unbanked savings held by Russian
households (so-called `mattress money') for intermediation by the nancial system (Tompson,
2004).
Although DI schemes have proved increasingly popular around the world, there is growing
concern that they can reduce incentives for depositors to monitor banks, while encouraging
bankers to run greater risks and, thus, increasing the risk of nancial instability. Whether this
concern is justied depends on the actual willingness and ability of depositors to discipline their
banks and is ultimately an empirical question.
In chapter 3, drawing on a unique database from the pre-deposit-insurance stage of Russia's
post-communist transition, we investigate whether depositors did actually discipline private,
domestic banks by withdrawing funds or requiring deposit rate premiums from less stable
institutions. We do nd that in spite of the country's apparent institutional immaturity, standard
measures of the capacity to meet deposit obligations (e.g., capitalization and liquidity) correlate
strongly with subsequent deposit inows. But while evidence for quantity-based discipline is
strong and robust, clear evidence that depositors demand higher deposit rates from less stable
institutions is lacking.
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In and of itself, the absence of price discipline should not be interpreted as suggesting that
market discipline is weak. Indeed, the combination of strong evidence for quantity disciplining
and nearly non-existent support for the standard form of price discipline is consistent with a
different type of price discipline that, arguably, is more sophisticated than that uncovered in
previous studies. Depositors, we say, exhibit this sophisticated discipline if they view the
deposit rate as a complementary proxy for institutional stability and not purely as a mechanism
through which banks compete for funds and offer compensation for risk or poor performance
reected in their fundamentals. So viewed, banks cannot necessarily expect to increase the net
inow of deposits, ceteris paribus, by raising deposit rates. More than just compensating for
observable risk, raising rates may carry the suggestion of additional risk.1 Testing this hypothesis,
we estimate the deposit supply function and indeed show that, particularly for poorly capitalized
banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of
deposit attraction.
Overall, our results do suggest the possibility of a real cost in the form of reduced market
discipline and subsequent moral hazard incentives as Russia recently moved forward with the
introduction of widespread deposit insurance. This cost has, however, to be weighed against
the benets of enhanced stability and more intense competition due to the creation of a more
level playing eld between public and private banks. The moral hazard cost can in principle be
minimized if reduced market discipline pressure is replaced by stronger regulatory pressure. The
fact that during the introduction of DI relatively few banks failed to meet the admission criteria
and lost the right to work with retail clients casts doubt on the CBR's determination to tighten
1 Carree (2003) provides econometric-based evidence that Russian banks offering high deposit rates were
likely to fail in the period 1994-1997. Two more recent examples of banks offering higher than average
deposit rates and subsequently failing include Sodbiznesbank (license revoked in May 2004) and bank Granit
(license revoked in May 2005). The risky credit strategy of the latter is described in a web-article available at
http://www.banki.ru/news/daytheme/?id=46849. Both pieces of evidence grant support to the idea that higher deposit
rates might be associated with higher risks.
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regulatory oversight.
Two other, still heavily debated, policy initiatives relate to the role of state- and foreign-owned
banks.
Partial public ownership in various forms remained a robust characteristic of the Russian
banking sector throughout the transition. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has played an
important role through the commercial banks under its direct control, namely Sberbank and
Vneshtorgbank. In addition, government bodies at several levels own banks. There are examples
of villages, provinces, cities, federal bodies and state rms in this position. At the beginning
of 2002 for example, we nd that the 27 banks that are majority owned by state bodies (out of
1277 banks in total) control 53% of banking assets and 39% of banking liabilities. Neglecting the
CBR's commercial banking activities through Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank., the remaining 25
public banks hold no less than 6% of total banking assets and 8% of total banking liabilities.
There are good reasons for seeing state dominance as a problem. State ownership and
state intervention in credit allocation tend to distort competition, to aggravate moral hazard by
encouraging the expectation of a bailout, and to undermine the efciency of intermediation, as
banks often pursue policies that reect the non-commercial requirements of the authorities rather
than good commercial sense (Barth et. al., 2004; Sherif et.al., 2003). Russian state-owned banks
(both federal and regional) have indeed derived substantial benets from state ownership: in
addition to the explicit state guarantee backing their retail deposits, which was scrapped only
at the end of 2003, state-owned banks have enjoyed privileged access to state funds, de facto
exemption from some regulatory norms and, on occasion, nancial support from the state. There
are, however, also costs to state ownership. State-owned banks have at times been required to
perform unprotable `social functions' on behalf of the state or to adopt policies that reect the
requirements of macroeconomic management rather than protability (Tompson, 2004).
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Ofcial policy is that state-owned banks should exist, if at all, to correct market failures: their
activities should be specialized in sectoral and other niches which the market will not address on
its own. The Russian authorities have long been committed to reducing the role of the state in the
banking sector. The regulatory privileges enjoyed by state-owned banks have been reduced, and
the adoption of DI legislation has deprived them of the explicit state guarantees. However, the
process of divesting the state of its banks has been slow (Tompson, 2004).
There is still relatively little foreign involvement in the sector. At the beginning of 2005,
non-residents owned stakes in 130 Russian credit institutions, of which 33 were wholly
foreign-owned. The foreign share of the sector's total capital was estimated at around 5 per
cent. This contrasts starkly with Central Europe, where local banking systems are now largely
foreign-owned.
The Association of Russian Banks has consistently lobbied the government to limit foreign
bank entry using the classic infant industry protection argument . The authorities have successfully
resisted such pressures, with the 12 per cent ceiling on the foreign capital share in the sector being
scrapped in 2002. The overall policy encourages greater foreign participation emphasizing the
benets foreign banks can bring to the sector in terms of skills, technology and credibility.
In chapter 4 we shed light on one specic aspect of this private/public/foreign ownership debate
- the relative efciency of different ownership structures. Estimating a cost frontier for all Russian
banks we nd that foreign banks are more efcient than domestic private banks, domestic private
banks are not more efcient than public banks and the introduction of deposit insurance increased
any existing efciency gap between public and private banks. These results are not driven by the
choice of production process, environment, risk preferences, activity mix, size, or econometric
approach.
The result of foreign banks' superior efciency is in line with most of the related literature on
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transition countries. On the one hand, most shareholders of foreign banks are themselves banks.
Consequently, these shareholders can provide their know-how in organization and risk analysis
to their subsidiaries. On the other hand, foreign banks would benet from better corporate
governance as shareholders originating from Western economies would be more accustomed to
monitoring bank managers.
But why, in contrast to the general prior, are private banks not more efcient than public
banks in Russia? Implicit state guarantees may have rendered Russia's public banks' access to
deposits less costly in terms of labor and physical capital, resulting in higher efciency. A greater
depositor base may in turn lead to a greater pool of loan applicants. Therefore, public banks may
also benet from granting a larger amount of loans than private banks for the same level of costs,
because they must expend less effort to nd borrowers. But if this explanation is true, the creation
of a more level playing eld via the introduction of a generalized deposit insurance scheme, no
matter how incomplete, should have mitigated the efciency difference, and yet we obtained the
opposite result. So this explanation must be abandoned. Still deposit insurance may have played a
role through moral hazard. In chapter 3 we provide strong evidence that Russian private domestic
banks were subject to strong and sophisticated market discipline before the introduction of deposit
insurance. This presumably forced them to improve their efciency. The introduction of deposit
insurance may however have reduced the pressure from market discipline, without replacing it
with sufciently strong regulatory pressure. In short, the introduction of deposit insurance may
have introduced moral hazard, leading to more, rather than less, inefcient management practices
in private banks.
Given the fact that Russian public banks are not more inefcient than private ones, the
large state presence in the Russian banking sector is not necessarily the cause of its relative
inefciency and the well-known corollaries of lower credit levels and more nancial instability.
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The implication is that bank privatization will not necessarily improve the efciency of the
Russian banking system. Since the main inefciency seems to reside with domestic private banks,
the system's efciency may benet more from increased competition than from privatization. This
can be achieved by creating a more level and more stable regulatory playing eld for all banks, an
objective the CBR is making progress on, and by opening the market to foreign competition.
Yet another policy initiative the CBR has been working on since 2002 is the reform of the
system of prudential supervision. A particular emphasis in this new regulatory framework has
been put on capital, traditionally perceived as a disincentive for banks (exploiting their limited
liability) to take excessive risks (Tompson, 2004). Notably, post-reform prudential regulation in
Russia is still largely focused on individual banks and pays little attention to systemic risk. This
approach treats all banks as independent entities, taking into account neither their exposure to
common risk factors, nor their physical interconnections through the interbank market. The latter,
however, are widely believed to enhance the risk of systemic contagion.
Contagion through direct interbank exposures occurs if Bank A, for whatever reason, defaults
on a payment to Bank B that produces a loss greater than B's capital and forces it to default
on a payment to Bank C with losses that are larger than C's capital, and so on down the chain.
Contagion may also run through indirect linkages. An adverse shock to one bank may create
uncertainty about other banks that may be subject to the same shock. Since interbank market
participants are generally risk averse and have asymmetric information about each other's nancial
health, individual banks may overreact to any negative news and withdraw their funds as quickly
as possible. Such a generalized liquidity crunch may push a solvent institution into illiquidity and
bankruptcy. The latter possibility suggests that adequate liquidity rather than capitalization might
be a more important condition of survival in times of systemic distress.
In chapter 5 we suggest a new approach to modelling systemic risk on the interbank market.
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Specically, we enrich the literature with a new transmission channel of contagion, the liquidity
channel. We apply this idea to the Russian banking sector and nd that the liquidity channel
contributes signicantly to our understanding of both actual interbank market crises and individual
bank defaults. The results corroborate the thesis that prudential regulation at individual bank
level is insufcient to prevent systemic crises, because this approach neglects the potential of
contagion. Especially bank-specic capital rules, no matter how sophisticated, will never sufce
to prevent coordination failures on the interbank market, simply because capital is not a very
important variable in assessing the risk of contagion and systemic meltdown. This is an important
lesson in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, that appears to have been essentially a worldwide
'panic' scenario kick-started by the initial correlated default of some banks. In addition, our
results suggest that the liquidity injections of a classical Lender of Last Resort can effectively
mitigate coordination failures on the interbank market not only in theory, but also in practice. In
short: liquidity matters.
Overall, this dissertation paints a rather familiar picture of the Russian banking system. Private
banks do little nancial intermediation, and, therefore, look inefcient by all standard measures
of efciency. Their wide-spread engagement in "non-traditional" activities (of legally dubious
nature, according to some observers) causes lack of trust on the part of their peers and, thus,
increases the risk of a systemic meltdown. Retail depositors are well aware of the problems
in the banking sector and ruthlessly penalize banks for poor performance and excessive risks.
In this light, the CBR's recent policies trying to foster nancial intermediation by solving the
aforementioned problems are most welcome.
The last but not least important contribution of this thesis is the construction of a consistent
time series of balances and prot and loss accounts for a large cross-section of Russian banks.
The next chapter starts with describing the data sources and the procedures applied for controlling
7
and aggregating the data. The resulting dataset constitutes a balanced and representative series of
nancial indicators covering the evolution of the Russian banking system over the last decade and
offering great potential for future empirical research.
8
References
Barth, James, Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine. (2004). Bank Regulation and Supervision: What
Works Best? Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 205-248.
Carree, Martin (2003). A hazard rate analysis of Russian commercial banks in the period 1994
1997. Economic Systems. Vol. 27, No. 3, 255-269.
Sherif, Khaled, Michael Borish and Alexandra Gross, (2003). State-owned Banks in the Transition:
Origins, Evolution and Policy Responses. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Tompson, William. (2004). Banking Reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects. OECD Eco-
nomics Working Paper #410.
9
Chapter 2 Heracles or Sisyphus? Finding, cleaning and reconstructing a database of
Russian banks
2.1 Introduction
Empirical studies on transition countries have been plagued by the lack of reliable datasets.
Limits in time and money rarely allow the construction of a dataset that meets the quality
standards of academic research. Sometimes data do not seem to exist at all. The genesis of the
Russian banking system, an economic experiment in banking on unprecedented scale, has not
given birth to much empirical research exactly because of the lack of data. Very few researchers
(see for example Schoors, 2000; others) were to gather some data on this very intriguing process.
We decided to put on the table a serious bid to construct a decent database that covers the
majority of the Russian banking system and turn it into a user-friendly format. This has become
possible because the banking system has become more transparent in the last seven years. In the
aftermath of the 1998 meltdown, the Russian regulatory authorities and other market participants
inside the country and abroad understood that the evaluation of the banking system's stability
and risks was long overdue and required more transparent data. Also the scientic society has
been paying more attention to transition economies and, specically, to their nancial systems.
The resulting demand for reliable systematized data on Russian banks stimulated the Russian
information agencies in cooperation with the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to start gathering and
providing such data on a regular basis.2
However, in this paper we show that although the Russian banking system exists for already
more than ten years, data in a decent format have been available on the market for the last 4-5
years at best. For earlier periods one can buy unbalanced datasets, characterized by different
2 It is worth mentioning that the rst regular data is available on the market since the third quarter of 1995, that is
immediately after the banking crisis of August 1995, while the data quality and completeness signicantly improves
in the rst quarter of 1999 (particularly the data of the Interfaks agency starts in that period), that is after some
recovery from the nancial crisis of August 1998.
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Table 2.1: Data Sources
Source Period of coverage Periodicity Degree of aggregation
Mobile Nov 95  Aug 03 Monthly Aggregated
KonfOb Oct 95  Jan 99 Quarterly Detailed
Interfax Apr 99  Jan 03 Quarterly Aggregated
numbers of banks, different and inconsistent formats and different periodicity. Since every
serious study in banking demands dynamic analysis, we set on the Sisyphus task to construct one
consistent and longer time series of a large cross-section of Russian banks than what is currently
available on the market.
Section 2.2 presents the data collection and describes its representativeness. In section 2.3 we
show how we aggregated the data and veried its internal consistency. Section 2.4 claries the
methodology we used to convert the separate datasets into a single system of nancial indicators.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data sources
We purchased data from the three Russian information agencies (see Table 2.13).
The Mobile database contains a wide range of monthly nancial indicators for all Russian
banks (see Table A.4 for details). Unfortunately, out of the total 169 indicators claimed, only 27
are provided for the whole 8-year period. Another set of 34 indicators runs from January-February
1998 till August 2003. So for the period 1998-August 2003, 61 variables are available at every
point in the time window. Furthermore, the majority of variables related to the Prot and Loss
accounts (P&L) are available only on a quarterly basis and only since October 2000. Those P&L
variables that are available monthly for earlier periods, are still absent for each last month of
the quarter, that is for 1.04, 1.07, 1.10 and 1.01. P&L data are critical for most of our research
purposes. Therefore, the Mobile dataset satises our data needs for the last 3 years only. Its
main advantage though is related to its perfect transparency: the agency provides the complete
3 The data on Prot and Loss accounts and regulatory ratios is provided by KonfOb since April 1997.
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methodology it uses to aggregate the raw accounting data into the standard nancial indicators as
well as the links to the corresponding legislative acts, which the methodology is based on. Using
that information we were able to build up the whole structure of the Mobile database (see Figures
B.1, B.2 and B.3 for more detail). This proved to be crucial for the conversion of the datasets into
a common format.
The KonfOb database contains for each bank-quarter a series of raw accounting data, stating
the number of the account (or the sub-account) and the corresponding amount of roubles.4 The
data on the regulatory ratios of the CBR are also included. The Interfax agency provides us, in
turn, with a wide set of aggregated nancial indicators containing the major information from the
Balance sheet, the P&L accounts and the regulatory standards (see Table A.5 for more detail).
Interfax variables are available for every quarter claimed in Table 2.1.
In order to construct one consistent time series of data, we had to convert the detailed KonfOb
data into the more condensed format of either Mobile or Interfax. We opt for Interfax what lets us
avoid an undesirable break in the series of a number of important P&L variables (such as interest
received/paid on loans/deposits of banks, rms, individuals etc.), as they are present in Mobile
since October 2000 only. Another important advantage over Mobile is that Interfax presents a
very detailed decomposition of major variables (e.g. loans, deposits, investments into securities,
interest received/paid etc.) by counterparty including a subdivision into residents/non-residents,
what is important for our research purposes.
Table 2.1 indicates that the KonfOb and Interfax databases complement each other almost
perfectly, having a joint coverage of 7,5 years (Oct 1995  Jan 2003) of quarterly data and since
April 1997 representing practically the whole population of Russian banks (see Table 2.2). The
main difculty relates to their different formats of data representation.
4 For 1998 we also have the decomposition of the total amount into roubles and foreign currency.
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Table 2.2: Representativeness of KonfOb and Interfax
Date Number of available banks Number of existing banks Number available / Number active, %
01.10.1995 787 2398 32,80%
01.01.1996 755 2297 32,90%
01.04.1996 753 2270 33,20%
01.07.1996 729 2158 33,80%
01.10.1996 763 2094 36,40%
01.01.1997 727 2033 35,80%
01.04.1997 1891 1940 97,50%
01.07.1997 1830 1845 99,20%
01.10.1997 1753 1766 99,30%
01.01.1998 1690 1707 99,00%
01.04.1998 1614 1643 98,20%
01.07.1998 1586 1600 99,10%
01.10.1998 1524 1533 99,40%
01.01.1999 1472 1483 99,30%
01.04.1999 1427 1439 99,20%
01.07.1999 1400 1409 99,40%
01.10.1999 1364 1388 98,30%
01.01.2000 1333 1350 98,70%
01.04.2000 1321 1340 98,60%
01.07.2000 1325 1335 99,30%
01.10.2000 1317 1324 99,50%
01.01.2001 1308 1323 98,90%
01.04.2001 1311 1322 99,20%
01.07.2001 1314 1327 99,00%
01.10.2001 1313 1325 99,10%
01.01.2002 1312 1328 98,80%
01.04.2002 1238 1334 92,80%
01.07.2002 1323 1343 98,50%
01.10.2002 1328 1338 99,30%
01.01.2003 1326 1341 98,90%
Average 93,10%
Note: Number of available banks includes only banks with an active licence. Source: Bank of Russia
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2.3 Consistency of the KonfOb-dataset
In the face of the tremendous time and effort needed to convert the datasets to a common
format (especially, taking into account the fact that the accounting standards in Russian banking
underwent dramatic changes in 19985) we wanted to have some condence in the data. Therefore,
we walked the extra mile of thoroughly testing it.
In order to check the internal consistency of the data, we rst needed to construct the balance
sheets and P&L accounts of each bank in each quarter from the raw accounting data of KonfOb.
For the years 1995  1997, when the old accounting principles were still in place, this was
accomplished according to the updated version of the August 1993 CBR instruction N 17 on the
establishment of a common nancial accounting system for commercial banks. For a number of
accounts missing (mostly due to their abolishment) from the methodology of the Bank of Russia
the method proposed by Androsov (1995) was used. The main sources used for the transformation
of the 1998 data were the updated version of the October 1997 CBR instruction N 17 and the
methodology proposed by Reschikova (1998). When there were differences between the sources
the ofcial methodology of the CBR was applied. Some lacking information, such as missing or
wrong names of accounts, missing indication active/passive etc., was lled in with the help of the
special literature (e.g. Tarakanova (1995), Kozlova (1999), Lavrushin (1999), December 2002
CBR Provision N 205-P, different editions of the Plan of Accounts).
We should mention that in almost all quarters (with the only exception of the rst quarter of
1997) the data related to the P&L statement are provided by KonfOb for a signicantly smaller
number of banks than the data related to the balance sheet. As far as the main goal at this stage
was to check the consistency of the data (and not to do any kind of analysis) we let all the banks
5 We should note that in spite of the accounting switch the variables appearing under one name measure the same
things across the different accounting standards as there exists a specic methodology (see Reschikova, 1998)
allowing one to convert old nancial accounts into the new ones. In those cases when matching failed (e.g. because
the old accounts were not detailed enough) the constructed time series were left incomplete. This explains the empty
cells in the last column of Figure B.4 (see below) indicating that matching was impossible.
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stay in our sample irrespective of the completeness of the provided information.
As a second step, we veried the internal consistency of the KonfOb database by testing the
following accounting identities6:X
items of a category = subtotalX
subtotals = totalX
assets =
X
liabilitiesX
revenues -
X
costs = prot
Potential mistakes or typing errors were checked requiring bank's total assets and statutory
capital to be positive. After removing non-functioning banks from the sample7 all the conditions
were satised indicating that the KonfOb database is internally consistent.
2.4 Conversion into a common format
The next step was to convert KonfOb into the format of Interfax. Unfortunately, the Interfax
database contains only the names of the nancial indicators but not the description of the method
used to construct them. Even after a number of our special inquiries the agency refused to
provide us with that kind of information. This left us with the necessity to work out the required
methodology ourselves.8 Obviously, it needed to stay as close as possible to the one used by the
agency. At this stage the transparency of Mobile proved to be useful.
The Mobile database covers the period from November 1995 till August 2003, thus having
a period overlap with each of the other two datasets. The aggregate indicators of Mobile and
Interfax are not identical. However, for each variable (or combination of variables) from Interfax
6 We omit the description of such elementary tests as whether the account type (active/passive) in the database
corresponds to its type from the ofcial Plan of Accounts, whether the nal balance under the account (active/passive)
corresponds to its type, as well as the equality of the sum under the debit to the sum under the credit. After correcting
some apparent typing errors all the specied tests were fullled.
7 A bank is considered to be non-functioning if no changes can be observed in its nancial statements during a number
of subsequent periods and/or if its licence has been revoked.
8 Elaborate attempts to relate the structure of the Interfaks database to the structure of the nancial statements (Balance
sheet and P&L report) were not only partially unsuccessful. In contrast to the lines of nancial statements, the
Interfaks indicators are not mutually exclusive, which seriously compromised our attempt to discover the necessary
accounting relations.
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the data allow us to construct an identical or very close combination of variables from Mobile.
Knowing the construction methodology of Mobile (provided by the agency) we could then deduce
the most probable methodology used by Interfax.
Thus, as a rst step we create pairs: an indicator from Interfax  the corresponding combination
of variables from Mobile.9 For each pair the correlation coefcient is calculated, and if its
value is equal (or close) to 1, the KonfOb data is converted into the format of Interfax using the
methodology of Mobile.10 Finally, as an additional test we compute the correlation coefcients
between the transformed KonfOb data and the corresponding variables from Mobile. Note,
however, that the availability of data in Mobile varies over time (see Table A.4), rendering
the exact construction of desired combinations for all periods simply not feasible. Complete
correlation is, therefore, for some variables technically impossible.
We present the correlation coefcients between Interfax and Mobile in Table 2.3 (column
4).11 Almost all values being above 0,99 with only three falling short of 0,95 can be viewed as a
comforting result.
These high values could, of course, partially be driven by the differences in bank size. To
control for that, we also report the correlation coefcients between the ratios of the corresponding
variables to total assets (column 5). Although being slightly lower, the corrected correlations still
remain at sufciently high levels to suggest that we have successfully mimicked the aggregation
methodology used by Interfax.
Using the resulting methodology (see Figure B.4 for details12) we converted the KonfOb data
9 The list of the resulting combinations is provided in Table A.6.
10 Mobile provides the methodologies of aggregation based on the old as well as on the new accounting standards.
11 For variables not available for the whole period 95-98 or 99-02 the correlations were taken based on the shorter series
(e.g. for P&L variables available in Mobile since October 2000 the correlations were taken for the period October
2000-January 2003).
12 One can use Figure B.4 to get a quick idea which of the constructed series is complete (i.e. available for the whole
period 1995-2002) and which is not. Empty cells in the last column of Figure B.4 imply that the corresponding
variables are available since 1998 only, because the matching between the new and old accounting standards was not
possible. Filled cells in the same column indicate availability since October 1995 for the balance sheet items and
since April 1997 for the P&L items and regulatory ratios.
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Table 2.3: Correlation coefcients between Mobile and KonfOb/Interfaks
Variable (or combination) KonfOb Interfax
95-98 95-98 (ratios) 99-02 99-02 (ratios)
Capital 98,60% 99,50% 99,90% 98,30%
Deposits of individuals 100,00% 98,50% 100,00% 98,90%
Government securities 100,00% 99,70% 100,00% 100,00%
Corresp. accounts with other banks 99,90% 99,80% 99,90% 99,60%
Corresp. accounts with CBR 100,00% 100,00% 98,10% 99,80%
Corresp. accounts with commercial banks 99,80% 99,70% 99,90% 98,80%
Required reserves 100,00% 99,90% 100,00% 100,00%
Loans to nonbanks 99,30% 97,50% 99,90% 98,40%
Non-performing loans 100,00% 99,90% 89,90% 95,40%
Investments into promis. notes of banks 100,00% 100,00% 99,90% 99,90%
Liabilities 99,70% 98,80% 100,00% 98,40%
Term deposits 99,70% 86,60% 100,00% 94,90%
Term deposits of individuals 100,00% 97,40% 100,00% 98,90%
Prot before tax 100,00% 99,90% 99,90% 100,00%
Assets 99,80% 99,90%
Loans to rms and individuals 99,50% 98,30% 99,90% 99,10%
Loans to domestic individuals 100,00% 99,60%
Investments into promis. notes 100,00% 100,00%
Interbank loans 96,70% 96,50%
Term deposits of 3 - 12 months 99,40% 93,80%
Term deposits of more than 1 year 96,10% 89,30%
Overdue liabilities 100,00% 85,70%
Interbank deposits 99,70% 99,60%
Claims of nonbanking sector 100,00% 98,90%
Settlement accounts 100,00% 99,40%
Debt securities issued 100,00% 100,00%
Certicates of savings issued 100,00% 100,00%
Personnel expenses 100,00% 100,00%
Interest received on loans to customers 100,00% 95,80%
Interest received on loans to banks 99,80% 94,00%
Interest paid on customer accounts 100,00% 100,00%
Interest paid on interbank deposits 100,00% 100,00%
Interest received on loans and deposits 100,00% 95,00%
Interest received from government and rms 100,00% 100,00%
Interest received from banks 100,00% 100,00%
Interest received from individuals 100,00% 100,00%
Interest paid on accounts, loans and deposits 100,00% 100,00%
Interest paid by government and rms 94,10% 97,80%
Interest paid on loans and deposits of CBR 100,00% 100,00%
Interest paid on loans and deposits of banks 92,80% 96,10%
Interest paid by individuals 100,00% 100,00%
Loans to banks of more than 1 year 100,00% 100,00%
Settlement accounts of government 99,80% 92,30%
Settlement accounts of rms and individuals 100,00% 98,60%
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into the format of Interfax.13 The correlation coefcients between transformed KonfOb variables
and Mobile indicators are presented in Table 2.3 (columns 2 and 3). Generally, we consider the
results to be satisfactory. Somewhat lower (and lacking) correlations are caused by the absence
of the required data in Mobile (see above). In none of the cases could we identify any potential
methodological problems or contradictions.
The next step is to put these data at work for empirical purposes. For illustration in Table A.7
we show how using the constructed database one can compute a set of variables, commonly used
in empirical studies. However, from Tables A.4 and A.5 it should be obvious that the dataset
allows calculation of much more variables than presented in Table A.7. For once, the main
constraint seems to be the researcher's creativity rather than data availability.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper describes the way we constructed a consistent time series of balances and prot and
loss accounts for a large cross-section of Russian banks. We describe our data sources and the
procedures applied for controlling and aggregating the data. The resulting dataset constitutes a
balanced and representative series of nancial indicators covering the evolution of the Russian
banking system over the last decade and offering great potential for further empirical research.
13 After merging the joint KonfOb-Interfaks dataset was slightly complemented with the data from Mobile. For
example, this complementation took place in the third quarter of 1998, when the P&L data were absent in KonfOb
but partially present in Mobile; namely, the data on prot were taken from Mobile.
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Appendix A Tables
Table A.4: Mobile database: list of variables
N Since Till Variable
1 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Letters of credit: claims
2 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Letters of credit: obligations
3 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Balance prot
4 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Distribution of the prot (dividends included)
5 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Net assets
6 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Net prot
7 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Income from investments in stocks
8 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Income of future periods
9 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Interbank deposits > 1 year
10 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Interbank deposits 3 - 12 months
11 01.02.1998 01.08.2003 Income from investments in securities
12 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Income from investments in government securities
13 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Income from investments in securities of local governments
14 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of individuals (certicates of savings included)
15 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Interest received on loans
16 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Deposits of non-residents < 3 months
17 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Deposits of non-residents 3 months - 1 year
18 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Deposits of non-residents > 1 year
19 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of rms > 1 year
20 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of rms 3 months - 1 year
21 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of rms < 3 months
22 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Income from foreign currency operations
23 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Income from operations with foreign currency
24 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Income from the re-evaluation of foreign currency
25 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Financing of social needs
26 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Government securities
27 01.08.2000 01.08.2003 Securities of foreign governments
28 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Interbank loans > 30 days
29 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Interbank loans of foreign banks < 3 months
30 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Interbank loans of foreign banks 3 months - 1 year
31 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Interbank loans of foreign banks > 1 year
32 01.08.2000 01.08.2003 Funds of other banks
33 01.08.2000 01.08.2003 Interbank loans < 30 days
34 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Loans to the economy
35 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to rms < 3 months
36 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to the economy > 3 years
37 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to rms 3 months - 1 year
38 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to individuals
39 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to individual entrepreneurs
40 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to individuals > 1 year
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41 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to individuals < 3 months
42 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to individuals 3 months - 1 year
43 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Loans to the economy > 1 year
44 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to nancial institutions (not banks) and funds
45 01.01.1998 01.05.1999 KK (not used)
46 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Correspondent accounts with CBR
47 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Correspondent accounts with other banks
48 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Liquid assets
49 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Highly liquid assets (according to N2)
50 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Liquid assets (according to N3)
51 01.06.2001 01.08.2003 Liquid assets - Highly liquid assets
52 01.11.1995 01.12.1997 Highly liquid assets (according to N2)
53 01.11.1995 01.12.1997 Liquid assets (according to N3)
54 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Leasing
55 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Loans to other banks
56 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to other banks > 1 year
57 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Loans to other banks 3 months - 1 year
58 01.12.1995 01.08.2003 Monthly prot
59 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Nongovernment securities
60 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Nongovernment securities (before 1998)
61 01.08.2000 01.08.2003 Securities of non-residents
62 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Risk-weighted assets
63 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Risk-weighted assets (group 1)
64 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Risk-weighted assets (group 2)
65 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Risk-weighted assets (group 3)
66 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Risk-weighted assets (group 4)
67 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Risk-weighted assets (group 5)
68 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Capital adequacy ratio
69 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Individuals' deposits-to-capital ratio
70 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Quick liquidity ratio (N2)
71 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Current liquidity ratio (N3)
72 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Long-term liquidity ratio (N4)
73 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 General liquidity ratio (N5)
74 01.06.2002 01.08.2003 Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7)
75 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Capital (for regulatory ratios calculation)
76 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Highly liquid assets (according to N2)
77 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Liquid assets (according to N3)
78 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Demand liabilities (according to N2)
79 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 Demand liabilities (according to N3)
80 01.02.1999 01.08.2003 The sum of passive accounts
81 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Operational income
82 01.02.1998 01.08.2003 Turnover on correspondent accounts
83 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Operational expenses
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84 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Required reserves
85 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Fixed assets
86 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Demand liabilities
87 01.11.1995 01.12.1997 Demand liabilities (according to N2)
88 01.11.1995 01.12.1997 Demand liabilities (according to N3)
89 01.01.2000 01.05.2003 Correction 8991
90 01.10.2000 01.05.2003 Correction 8999
91 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest received on loans to individuals
92 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest received on loans to rms
93 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest received on loans to credit institutions
94 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest income from other sources
95 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest received on other funds granted to banks
96 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 PDZS = PDZSB+PDZSF+PDZSO
97 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Overdue interest received on loans to banks
98 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Overdue interest received on loans to individuals
99 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Overdue interest received on loans to rms
100 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest from loans to banks
101 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest from loans to clients
102 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Other nonworking assets
103 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 The result of activities: loss
104 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Nonperforming loans
105 01.06.2001 01.08.2003 Nonperforming loans to banks
106 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Overdue promissory notes
107 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Working assets
108 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Expenses of future periods
109 01.02.1998 01.08.2003 Expenses from operations with securities
110 01.08.2000 01.08.2003 Overdue settlement documents
111 01.09.2001 01.08.2003 Settlement documents not paid in time
112 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Loan loss reserves
113 01.02.1998 01.08.2003 Interest paid on loans
114 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on loans to banks
115 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on loans to nonbanks
116 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Expenses from operations with securities
117 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on interbank deposits
118 01.07.2001 01.07.2003 Interest paid on loans from CBR
119 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on deposits of nonbanks
120 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on interbank loans
121 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on loans from nonbanks
122 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on deposits of individuals
123 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest expenses from other sources
124 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Other expenses
125 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Interest paid on clients' accounts
126 01.07.2001 01.07.2003 Interest paid on overdue interbank loans
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127 01.07.2001 01.07.2003 Interest paid on overdue loans from CBR
128 01.01.2001 01.01.2002 Interest paid on overdue loans from others
129 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Personnel expenses
130 01.02.1998 01.08.2003 Expenses from operations with foreign currency
131 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Expenses from foreign currency exchange
132 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 Expenses from the re-evaluation of foreign currency
133 01.11.1995 01.12.1997 Total assets
134 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Obligations to supply money resources
135 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Claims on money resources
136 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Budget and budget funds accounts
137 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Accounts of enterprises
138 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Capital according to rules before 01.02.99
139 01.03.2003 01.08.2003 Capital according to rules since 01.05.02
140 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Funds of the clients in use (for transactions)
141 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Other funds of non-residents < 3 months
142 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Other funds of non-residents 3 months - 1 year
143 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Other funds of non-residents > 1 year
144 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Total liabilities
145 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Liabilities > 1 year
146 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Total liabilities + capital
147 01.07.1999 01.08.2003 Payment cards
148 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Payment cards
149 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Settlement accounts
150 01.10.2000 01.07.2003 The result of activities: prot
151 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Statutory capital
152 01.04.1996 01.09.1997 Statutory capital (not used)
153 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 The summation of all active /passive accounts
154 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Securities issued
155 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 The summation of all active accounts
156 01.02.2003 01.08.2003 The summation of all passive accounts
157 01.08.2000 01.08.2003 All securities issued
158 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Deposits of individuals > 30 days
159 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of individuals > 1 year
160 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Deposits of individuals < 30 days
161 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of individuals 3 - 12 months
162 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Deposits of individuals < 3 months
163 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Certicates of savings
164 01.11.1995 01.08.2003 Deposits of rms > 30 days
165 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Deposits of rms < 30 days
166 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Investments into promissory notes of banks
167 01.01.2002 01.08.2003 Investments into promissory notes
168 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Investments into promissory notes of enterprises
169 01.01.1998 01.08.2003 Investments into promissory notes of enterprises > 1 year
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Table A.5: Interfaks database: list of variables
N Description
if9999 Rank by assets
if0000 Bank's name
1. Main characteristics of banks
if0101 Location
if0102 Registration number
if0103 Assets
if0104 Assets growth, %
if0105 Capital
if0106 Rank by capital
if0107 Capital growth, %
if0108 Before-tax prot
if0109 Rank by before-tax prot
2. Volume and structure of claims of individuals
if0201 Deposits of individuals
if0202 Rank by deposits of individuals
if0203 Change in deposits of individuals, %
if0204 Rouble-denominated deposits of individuals
if0205 Change in rouble-denominated deposits of individuals, %
if0206 Dollar-denominated deposits of individuals
if0207 Change in dollar-denominated deposits of individuals ($), %
if0208 Payment cards
if0209 Share of individuals' deposits in liabilities, %
if0210 Individuals' deposits-to-capital ratio (obligatory regulation N11)
3. Investments into government securities
if0301 Government securities
if0302 Rank by government securities
if0303 Change in government securities, %
if0304 Rouble-denominated government securities
if0305 Change in rouble-denominated government securities, %
if0306 Dollar-denominated government securities
if0307 Change in dollar-denominated government securities($), %
if0308 Promissory notes issued or guaranteed by government
if0309 Share of government securities in assets, %
if0310 Securities issued by regions and municipalities
4. Claims on banks
if0401 Correspondent accounts with other banks
if0402 Share of CBR in correspondent accounts with other banks, 100%
if0403 Share of Russian banks in correspondent accounts with other banks, %
if0404 Share of foreign banks in correspondent accounts with other banks, %
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if0405 Required reserves
if0406 Net interbank loans
if0407 Share of deposits with CBR in interbank loans, %
if0408 Share of domestic banks in interbank loans, %
if0409 Share of foreign banks in interbank loans, %
if0410 Net investments into marketable debt of banks
5. Loans to nonbanks
if0501 Net loans to nonbanks
if0502 Change in net loans to nonbanks, %
if0503 Share of net loans to nonbanks in assets, %
if0504 Loans to domestic nonbanks
if0505 Share of federal government in loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0506 Share of regional and local governments in loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0507 Share of rms and individual entrepreneurs in loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0508 Share of individuals in loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0509 Loans to foreign nonbanks
if0510 Reserves for loans to and promissory notes issued by nonbanks
if0511 Non-performing loans
6. Non-performing loans to nonbanks
if0601 Non-performing loans to domestic nonbanks
if0602 Change in non-performing loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0603 Share of federal government in non-performing loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0604 Share of regional governments in non-performing loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0605 Share of rms in non-performing loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0606 Share of individuals in non-performing loans to domestic nonbanks, %
if0607 Non-performing loans to foreign nonbanks
if0608 Change in non-performing loans to foreign nonbanks, %
if0609 Share of rms in non-performing loans to foreign nonbanks, %
if0610 Share of individuals in non-performing loans to foreign nonbanks, %
7. Investments into promissory notes
if0701 Investments into promissory notes
if0702 Rank by investments into promissory notes
if0703 Share of promissory notes in assets, %
if0704 Share of promissory notes in loans, %
if0705 Share of government in promissory notes, %
if0706 Share of banks in promissory notes, %
if0707 Share of other issuers in promissory notes, %
if0708 Total turnover of promissory notes
if0709 Turnover of promissory notes issued by government
if0710 Turnover of promissory notes issued by banks
if0711 Turnover of promissory notes issued by others
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8. Interbank loans
if0801 Interbank loans
if0802 Rank by interbank loans
if0803 Share of interbank loans in assets, %
if0804 Share of loans to foreign banks in interbank loans, %
if0805 Share of loans to foreign banks of less than 1 week in interbank loans, %
if0806 Share of loans to foreign banks of 1 week to 1 year in interbank loans, %
if0807 Share of loans to foreign banks of more than 1 year in interbank loans, %
if0808 Share of nonperforming loans to foreign banks in interbank loans, %
if0809 Share of loans domestic banks in interbank loans, %
if0810 Share of loans to domestic banks of less than 1 week in interbank loans, %
if0811 Share of loans to domestic banks of 1 week to 1 year in interbank loans, %
if0812 Share of loans to domestic banks of more than 1 year in interbank loans, %
if0813 Share of nonperforming loans to domestic banks in interbank loans, %
9. Assets denominated in foreign currency
if0901 Assets denominated in foreign currency
if0902 Share of foreign-currency-denominated assets in total assets, %
if0903 Share of loans to nonbanking sector in foreign-currency-denominated assets, %
if0904 Share of claims on banks in foreign-currency-denominated assets, %
if0905 Share of nonbank debt securities in foreign-currency-denominated assets, %
if0906 Share of other assets in foreign-currency-denominated assets, %
10. Foreign assets
if1001 Claims on non-residents, total
if1002 Rank on claims on non-residents
if1003 Change in claims on non-residents, %
if1004 Claims on non-residents: loans to non-banking sector
if1005 Claims on non-residents: interbank loans and correspondent accounts
if1006 Share of non-residents in assets, %
if1007 Share of non-residents in loans to non-banking sector, %
if1008 Share of non-residents in interbank loans and correspondent accounts, %
11. Term structure of liabilities
if1101 Liabilities
if1102 Rank on liabilities
if1103 Change in liabilities, %
if1104 Share of current and correspondent accounts in liabilities, %
if1105 Share of term deposits with maturity of less than 90 days in liabilities, %
if1106 Share of term deposits with maturity of 90 days to 1 year in liabilities, %
if1107 Share of term deposits with maturity of more than 1 year in liabilities, %
if1108 Share of debt securities with maturity of less than 90 days in liabilities, %
if1109 Share of debt securities with maturity of 90 days to 1 year in liabilities, %
if1110 Share of debt securities with maturity of more than 1 year in liabilities, %
if1111 Share of overdue liabilities in liabilities, %
if1112 Share of liabilities with uncertain term to maturity in liabilities, %
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12. Claims of banks
if1201 Claims of banks
if1202 Share of correspondent accounts in claims of banks, %
if1203 Share of correspondent accounts of domestic banks in claims of banks, %
if1204 Share of correspondent accounts of foreign banks in claims of banks, %
if1205 Share of interbank deposits in claims of banks, %
if1206 Share of deposits from central bank of Russia in claims of banks, %
if1207 Share of interbank deposits of domestic banks in claims of banks, %
if1208 Share of interbank deposits of foreign banks in claims of banks, %
13. Claims of non-banking sector
if1301 Claims of nonbanking sector
if1302 Settlement accounts
if1303 Share of government in settlement accounts, %
if1304 Share of domestic rms in settlement accounts, %
if1305 Share of domestic individuals in settlement accounts, %
if1306 Share of foreign rms in settlement accounts, %
if1307 Share of foreign individuals in settlement accounts, %
if1308 Term deposits
if1309 Share of government in term deposits, %
if1310 Share of domestic rms in term deposits, %
if1311 Share of domestic individuals in term deposits, %
if1312 Share of foreign rms in term deposits, %
if1313 Share of foreign individuals in term deposits, %
14. Debt securities issued
if1401 Debt securities issued
if1402 Rank on debt securities issued
if1403 Issued rouble-denominated promissory notes outstanding
if1404 Turnover on issued rouble-denominated promissory notes
if1405 Issued foreign-currency-denominated promissory notes outstanding
if1406 Turnover on issued foreign currency-denominated promissory notes
if1407 Certicates of deposit issued
if1408 Certicates of savings issued
if1409 Bonds issued
if1410 Share of debt securities in liabilities, %
15. Liabilities denominated in foreign currency
if1501 Liabilities denominated in foreign currency
if1502 Share of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities in liabilities, %
if1503 Share of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities in deposits of nonbanks, %
if1504 Share of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities in claims of banks, %
if1505 Share of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities in issued debt securities, %
if1506 Share of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities in other liabilities, %
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16. Foreign liabilities
if1601 Total claims of non-residents
if1602 Change in claims of non-residents, %
if1603 Claims of non-residents: deposits from nonbanking sector
if1604 Claims of non-residents: "investment" and "special" accounts
if1605 Claims of non-residents: interbank deposits
if1606 Share of non-residents in liabilities, %
if1607 Share of non-residents in claims of nonbanking sector, %
if1608 Share of non-residents in interbank deposits, %
17. Money market operations
if1701 Rouble-denominated interbank loans: balance
if1702 Rouble-denominated interbank deposits: balance
if1703 Rouble-denominated interbank loans: turnover
if1704 Rouble-denominated interbank deposits: turnover
if1705 Foreign-currency-denominated interbank loans: balance
if1706 Foreign-currency-denominated interbank deposits: balance
if1707 Foreign-currency-denominated interbank loans: turnover
if1708 Foreign-currency-denominated interbank deposits: turnover
if1709 Share of interbank loans in assets, %
if1710 Share of interbank deposits in liabilities, %
18. Composition of prot
if1801 Prot before tax
if1802 Net interest margin
if1803 Net re-evaluation of assets
if1804 Net provisions for losses
if1805 Net income from other sources, total
if1806 Personnel expenses
if1807 Prot before provisions for losses and asset re-evaluation
19. Composition of interest income and expenses
if1901 Interest income
if1902 Share of loans to customers in interest income, %
if1903 Share of interbank loans in interest income, %
if1904 Share of debt securities in interest income, %
if1905 Share of other sources in interest income, %
if1906 Interest expenses
if1907 Share of customer accounts in interest expenses, %
if1908 Share of interbank deposits in interest expenses, %
if1909 Share of debt securities in interest expenses, %
if1910 Share of other sources in interest expenses, %
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20. Composition of interest income by counterparty
if2001 Interest received on loans and deposits
if2002 Share of government in interest income, %
if2003 Share of central bank of Russia in interest income, %
if2004 Share of domestic banks in interest income, %
if2005 Share of foreign banks in interest income, %
if2006 Share of rms owned by federal government in interest income, %
if2007 Share of rms owned by local governments in interest income, %
if2008 Share of domestic private non-banking rms in interest income, %
if2009 Share of foreign non-banking rms in interest income, %
if2010 Share of individual entrepreneurs in interest income, %
if2011 Share of individuals in interest income, %
21. Composition of interest expenses by counterparty
if2101 Interest paid on accounts, loans and deposits
if2102 Share of government in interest expenses, %
if2103 Share of central bank of Russia in interest expenses, %
if2104 Share of domestic banks in interest expenses, %
if2105 Share of foreign banks in interest expenses, %
if2106 Share of rms owned by federal government in interest expenses, %
if2107 Share of rms owned by local governments in interest expenses, %
if2108 Share of domestic private non-banking rms in interest expenses, %
if2109 Share of foreign non-banking rms in interest expenses, %
if2110 Share of individuals in interest expenses, %
22. Regulation ratios
if2201 Capital adequacy ratio (N1)
if2202 Quick liquidity ratio (N2)
if2203 Current liquidity ratio (N3)
if2204 Long-term liquidity ratio (N4)
if2205 General liquidity ratio (N5)
if2206 Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7)
if2207 Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N9.1)
if2208 Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N10.1)
if2209 Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12)
if2210 Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio (N13)
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Table A.6: Matching Interfaks and Mobile
Variable (or combination) Interfax Mobile
Capital if0105 138
Deposits of individuals if201+if1408 158+160
Government securities if0301 26
Corresp. accounts with other banks if0401 46+47
Corresp. accounts with CBR if0402/100*if0401 46
Corr. accounts with other banks (if0403+if0404)/100*if0401 47
Required reserves if0405 84
Loans to nonbanks if0504+if0509 34+44+168
Non-performing loans if0511 104
Promis. notes of banks if0706/100*if0701 166
Term deposits if1308+if1407+if1408 158+160+164+165
Term deposits of individuals (if1311+if1313)/100*if1308+if1408 158+160-163
Prot before tax if1801 3
Loans to rms and individuals (if0507+if0508)/100*if0504+if0509 34+168
Loans to domestic individuals if0508/100*if0504 38-39
Investments into promis. notes if0701 167
Interbank loans if0801 55
Term deposits of less than 3 months if1105/100*if1101 162+33+32-9-10-105
Term deposits of 3 - 12 months if1106/100*if1101 10+20+161+30
Term deposits of more than 1 year if1107/100*if1101 9+19+159+31
Overdue liabilities if1111/100*if1101 105
Interbank deposits if1205/100*if1201 32+28+33
Settlement accounts if1302 136+137
Debt securities issued if1401 157
Certicates of savings issued if1408 163
Personnel expenses if1806 129+25
Interest received on loans if1902/100*if1901 101
Interest received on loans to banks if1903/100*if1901 100
Interest paid on customer accounts if1907/100*if1906 115
Interest paid on interbank deposits if1908/100*if1906 114
Interest received if2001 100+101
Interest received from state and rms (if2002+if2006:if2009)/100*if2001 101-91-98
Interest received from banks (if2003+if2004+if2005)/100*if2001 100
Interest received from individuals (if2010+if2011)/100*if2001 91+98
Interest paid on loans and deposits if2101 114+115
Interest paid by government and rms (if2102+if2106:if2109)/100*if2101 119+121+123+125+128
Interest paid on deposits of CBR if2103/100*if2101 118+127
Interest paid on deposits of banks (if2104+if2105)/100*if2101 117+120+126
Interest paid by individuals if2110/100*if2101 122
Loans to banks of more than 1 year (if0807+if0812)/100*if0801 56
Settlement accounts of government if1303/100*if1302 136
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Table A.7: Variables construction
Variable Construction Methodology
Deposits of CBR if1206 * if1201
Deposits of banks (if1207+if1208) * if1201
Deposits of all banks if1205 * if1201
Deposits of government if1303*if1302+if1309*if1308
Deposits of rms (if1304+if1306)*if1302+(if1310+if1312)*if1308
Deposits of individuals (if1305+if1307)*if1302+(if1311+if1313)*if1308
Deposits of individuals (2) if201
Deposits of all nonbanks if1301
Total loans (no government and CBR) (if507+if508)*if504+if509+if801
Loans to banks if801
Loans to government (if505+if506)*if504
Loans to rms if507*if504+if509
Loans to individuals if508*if504
Loans to all nonbanks if504+if509
Return on assets diff (if108) / Average assets
Return on equity diff (if108) / Average capital
Interest rate on total (no gov. and CBR) deposits diff((if2104+. . . +if2110)*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of CBR diff(if2103*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of banks diff((if2104+if2105)*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of all banks diff(if1908*if1906)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of government diff(if2102*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of rms diff((if2106+...+if2109)*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of individuals diff(if2110*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of individuals(2) diff(if2110*if2101)/Average deposits
Interest rate on deposits of all nonbanks diff(if1907*if1906)/Average deposits
Interest rate on total loans (no gov. and CBR) diff((if2004+. . . +if2011)*if2001)/Average loans
Interest rate on loans to banks diff((if2004+if2005)*if2001)/Average loans
Interest rate on loans to government diff(if2002*if2001)/Average loans
Interest rate on loans to rms diff((if2006+. . . +if2010)*if2001)/Average loans
Interest rate on loans to individuals diff(if2011*if2001)/Average loans
Interest rate on loans to all nonbanks diff(if1902*if1901)/Average loans
Personnel expenses / Assets diff (if1806) / Average assets
Net interest income / Assets diff (if1802) / Average assets
Net income from other sources / Assets diff (if1805) / Average assets
Non-performing loans / Total loans if511 / (if504 + if509)
Government securities / Assets if301 / if103
Term deposits / Claims of nonbanking sector if1308 / if1301
Superliquid assets / Assets (if402*if401+if407*if406) / if103
Required reserves / Assets if405 / if103
Note: 'diff' indicates the necessity to take rst differences of the ow PNL variables reected in nancial statements in a
cumulative manner (accumulated over quarters).
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Appendix B Figures
Note for Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3: moving from the left to the right gives the decomposition
of aggregate variables into their components e.g. Demand liabilities consist of Interbank loans <
1m, Funds of other banks, Budget accounts, Deposits of individuals and rms < 1m and Accounts
of enterprises; the latter, in turn, includes Settlement accounts and Funds of clients in use. "-" in
front of, e.g., Letters of credit indicates that it is only one of the many components of the Funds of
clients in use. Arrows indicate additional structural relations. "*" - means that only a part of the
variable truly belongs to the corresponding place on the scheme. Reference numbers are provided
in brackets.
Note for Figure B.4: Account numbers used to construct the Interfax-like indicators from
the KonfOb data are reported. D and C stand for the resulting sum under the debit and credit,
respectively; A stands for active sub-accounts of the corresponding account.
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Chapter 3 Sophisticated Discipline in a Nascent Deposit Market: Evidence from
Post-Communist Russia
3.1 Introduction
Depositors may penalize banks for undertaking risks, performing poorly or otherwise
jeopardizing the value of their assets. By withdrawing funds or requiring deposit rate premiums
from less stable institutions, their actions have the potential to increase allocative efciency and
mitigate moral hazard. But this sort of quantity or price-based discipline only materializes if
depositors possess both the willingness and ability to monitor their banks. Whereas the former
depends upon the degree to which deposits are believed to be protected by regulatory oversight
and (explicit or implicit) insurance guarantees, the latter requires both access to and understanding
of the relevant bank data. While not as much of a concern when depositors are experienced and
mechanisms for disseminating nancial information are reliable, the ability to discipline banks in
settings in which these features are under-developed has been open to question. Indeed, doubts
have been expressed as to the private sector's capacity for effective monitoring in countries in
which informational structures  such as accounting rules and disclosure requirements  lag
behind international standards (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004). Careful empirical studies, however,
that either conrm or cast doubt upon the ability of depositors to discipline banks in immature
institutional environments are rare.
Post-communist Russia presents us with a worthy test case of depositors' capacity to provide
discipline in a nascent market with under-developed institutions. Concurrent with the systemic
transformation launched in the early 1990s, hundreds of private commercial banks entered its
new, largely unregulated, deposit market. Not surprisingly, several signicant banking crises
ensued. And since monies held in non-state banks were uninsured, the country's depositors made
quick acquaintance with the private costs of institutional failure. In other words, from soon after
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the dawn of the new market era, depositors possessed ample motivation to penalize banks known
to be performing poorly and/or assuming undue risks. But, as noted, the willingness to impose
discipline on institutions recognized as less stable is not tantamount to the ability to do so.
Drawing on a unique database from the pre-deposit-insurance stage of Russia's post-communist
transition, we investigate below whether depositors have actively disciplined private, domestic
banks. And we do nd that in spite of the country's apparent institutional immaturity, standard
measures of the capacity to meet deposit obligations (e.g., capitalization and liquidity) correlate
strongly with subsequent deposit inows. But while evidence for quantity-based discipline is
strong and robust, that for the standard form of price-based discipline is not. Clear evidence, that
is, that depositors demand higher deposit rates from less stable institutions is lacking.
In and of itself, the absence of price discipline should not be interpreted as suggesting that
market discipline is weak. Indeed, the combination of strong evidence for quantity disciplining
and nearly non-existent support for the standard form of price discipline is consistent with a
different type of price discipline that, arguably, is more sophisticated than that uncovered in
previous studies. Depositors, we say, exhibit this sophisticated discipline if they view the deposit
rate as a complementary proxy for institutional stability and not purely as a mechanism through
which banks compete for funds and offer compensation for risk or poor performance reected
in their fundamentals. So viewed, banks cannot necessarily expect to increase the net inow of
deposits, ceteris paribus, by raising deposit rates. More than just compensating for observable
risk, raising rates may carry the suggestion of additional risk. If so, standard tests for market
discipline may not produce strong results and should be complemented by direct estimation of the
deposit supply function. This would produce evidence consistent with sophisticated discipline if
higher rates exhibited diminishing marginal, even negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction.
This article contributes to the general literature on market discipline in two important ways.
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First, our data allow us to explore the impact of depositor type  i.e., household, rm or bank
 on market discipline in a manner not done elsewhere. Second, we estimate depositors' supply
function in order to evaluate whether or not the deposit rate is interpreted as a supplementary proxy
for bank-level risk. In so doing, we present evidence consistent with this form of sophisticated
discipline. The article is divided into ve sections. Section 3.2 provides a review of the relevant
literatures on market discipline and Russia's nascent banking sector. Section 3.3 discusses the
empirical methodology, and section 3.4 presents the data and variables used in the subsequent
analysis. We then present our empirical results in section 3.5, followed by conclusions in section
3.6.
3.2 Literature and Background
3.2.1 Market Discipline in Deposit Markets
Much of the evidence for deposit market discipline comes from countries with mature and
relatively transparent banking sectors. For instance, a number of studies of partially uninsured
large deposits in the United States demonstrate that a bank's cost of funds in one period is
associated with previous period measures of depositor risk: low capital-assets ratios (Cook and
Spellman, 1994; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Park and Peristiani, 1998); high variability of return
on assets (Hannan and Hanweck, 1988); higher percentages of bad loans and, generally, lower
return on assets (Cook and Spellman, 1994; Park and Peristiani, 1998); and greater exposure to
junk bonds (Brewer and Mondschean, 1994). Cook and Spellman (1994), moreover, show that
interest rates on wholly insured deposits at S&L's reect capitalization and performance measures;
even government sponsored guarantees, after all, may not be ironclad. Finally, Park and
Peristiani (1998) demonstrate a negative relationship between U.S. thrifts' predicted probability of
failure and the subsequent growth of large uninsured deposits. Both price and quantity discipline,
in other words, have been shown to prevail in the United States' banking sector, particularly with
respect to deposits that are not fully insured. A recent study using cross-country panel data from
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thirty-two OECD countries conrms the presence of market disciplining behavior in other mature
institutional environments as well (Nier and Baumann, 2006).
A few empirically focused studies have pursued this theme in countries with less developed
informational infrastructures. Controlling for the presence of deposit insurance and using data
from a sample of both OECD and developing countries, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)
nd a negative relationship between the implicit cost of bank funds and prior period measures of
bank capitalization, protability and liquidity. The evidence for quantity disciplining, however, is
weaker. Indeed, they nd no signicant relationship between the net growth in bank deposits and
earlier measures of either protability or liquidity. Investigating experiences in Argentina, Chile
and Mexico, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) turn up evidence consistent with the standard
forms of both quantity and price discipline. Controlling simultaneously for several measures of
bank stability and risk, they demonstrate that banks' deposits increase and their deposit rates
generally decrease with a reduction in the percentage of non-performing loans and improvements
in liquidity and capitalization. These authors also highlight how the relative magnitude of deposit
market discipline increases after banking crises, suggesting that shocks to the sector breed greater
depositor vigilance.
Most previous studies of deposit market discipline have not distinguished depositors by type.
Although some have examined the role of actors holding deposits of different sizes (Cook and
Spellman, 1994; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001), our data allow us to distinguish depositors
by legal status  i.e., non-bank rm, bank or household. While likely to be correlated with deposit
size, a party's legal identity may correlate with its willingness and ability to impose discipline.
Relative to households, for instance, enterprise managers might be presumed to either have better
access to or more appreciation for the nancial information released by banks. They may also
face lower costs of switching institutions, a potentially non-trivial consideration for households,
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particularly those outside the largest urban areas where retail banking networks are poorly
developed.
We are unaware of any previous study that empirically demonstrates a link between quantity
discipline and deposit rates. Our inspiration here is drawn from a theoretical framework outlined
by Hellman et al. (1998, 2000) in which
. . . depositors can perfectly infer (from the bank's deposit rate and capital base) whether the
bank will gamble or invest in the prudent asset . . . assumptions [chosen] not for realism but
to consider an environment most conducive to solving the moral hazard problem via private
monitoring (1998, p. 5).14
From our perspective, the important point in their stylized framework is that deposit rates
and capitalization  both independently and through their interaction  determine the net inow
of deposits and, thus, the presence of market discipline. Higher interest rates, particularly for
lower levels of capitalization, are interpreted as coincident with a riskier future lending strategy.
Depositors, thus, weigh the benets of higher rates against the increased potential for bank
failure. The authors' caveat as to their assumption's realism clearly speaks to a lack of credulity
in depositors' actual ability to read banks' behavior in this manner.15 So to the extent that such
sentiment as to depositor sophistication is widely held, it would seem reasonable to identify any
empirical support for the actual interpretation of deposit rates in this manner as evidence of a
sophisticated form of discipline.
3.2.2 Russia's Nascent Banking Sector
Russians' temporal experience with liberalized deposit markets has been brief and the country's
14 In Hellman et al.'s model (1998, 2000), deposit rate competition among banks lowers their franchise value and, with
it, incentives for making non-risky loans. The quote in the text above is taken from the working paper version (1998),
which considers this competition in a world without deposit insurance. In an unpublished paper, Hanousek and
Roland (2001) model a similar relationship and offer some empirical support from the Czech Republic.
15 Stiglitz (1994), one of the article's co-authors, suggests in a book on post-communist reform that it would be
unrealistic to rely on the private market to discipline banks: Individuals have neither the capacity nor the incentive,
even in the absence of deposit insurance, to monitor effectively (247).
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institutions to support depositor monitoring have had little time to develop. Indeed, Barth et al.
(2004, 2006) recently ranked Russia in the bottom quintile of over one hundred countries on a
private sector monitoring (PSM) index, a measure meant to capture the quality of institutions
that facilitate deposit market discipline.16 Although the ranking raises questions about Russian
depositors' ability to monitor and discipline banks, it does not provide any sense of their interest
in doing so. However, a brief review of Russia's post-communist nancial sector development
suggests that the intensity of this interest should not be under-estimated.
When nancial markets were rst permitted in the early 1990s, bank deposits, particularly
those of households, were held almost exclusively by Sberbank, the state savings bank. But lax
entry policies in the early transition period contributed to the quick development of a robust and
competitive market for deposits. By early 1994, on the back of heavy advertising and relatively
high interest rates, private banks had captured over half of the household deposit market. The era's
mix of liberalized deposit rates, naïve depositors and over-burdened regulators proved dangerous.
A system-wide liquidity crisis in 1995 led to bankruptcies of some of the country's largest private
retail banks. Their failures followed by only a year the collapse of several high-prole pyramid
schemes, the largest of which, MMM, contributed to the loss of savings of up to ten million
Russians. In the popular mind, the promise of high returns on savings quickly became associated
with institutional instability.
The image problem of private banks was furthered by the macroeconomic crisis of 1998.
16 The following considerations are factored positively into a country's score on the PSM index: (1) whether a certied
external audit of the bank's nancial statement is required; (2) whether all of the ten biggest banks are rated by
international rating agencies; (3) whether income statements include accrued or unpaid interest or principal on
non-performing loans and whether banks are required to produce consolidated nancial statements; (4) whether
off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public; (5) whether banks must disclose risk management procedures to
the public; and (6) whether subordinated debt is allowable as a part of regulatory capital. The version of the PSM
index presented in Barth et al. (2006) is slightly modied to include the percentage of the ten biggest banks rated by
domestic rating agencies; since there is no entry for Russia in this sub-category, its PSM index is not reported. The
authors' measures of bank transparency paint a similar picture. With respect to both the quality of its bank audit
regime and its pace in adopting best practice accounting standards, Russia is ranked in the bottom third of countries
surveyed. Barth et al.'s (2004) PSM index for Russia, 5, lags behind those of the countries covered in the analysis of
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001): Argentina and Chile, both 8, and Mexico, 6.
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In August, the Russian government devalued the ruble and defaulted on its bond obligations.
Because of their exposure to hard currency liabilities and ruble-denominated assets, including
government securities, a number of banks were driven into insolvency. Again, many of the largest
players on the retail market proved unable (or in some cases, unwilling) to meet their obligations
to depositors (Perotti, 2003; Radaev, 2000; Schoors, 2001; Spicer and Pyle, 2002).
Russia's relatively short history with liberalized deposit markets explains both depositors'
initial naivete in the face of high promised returns and the relative under-development of
institutions that facilitate private sector monitoring (Barth et al., 2004 and 2006). But their
experiences in the mid-1990s quickly heightened awareness of the private costs of bank failure.
Circumstances taught them the benets of carefully monitoring their nancial institutions.
Indeed, as has been demonstrated elsewhere, we suspect that the nancial crises in Russia have
precipitated more vigilant depositor discipline (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). Moreover,
the conation of high interest rates with institutional instability that resulted from the crises of
the mid-1990s suggests that deposit rates themselves might be interpreted, in part, as a proxy for
otherwise unobservable bank risk.
3.3 Methodology
We start by investigating the evidence for market discipline generally and then proceed to look
for it in the behavior of specic depositor groups. In so doing, we employ two standard sets of
reduced form models:
Di;t = 
0Banki;t 1 + dt + vi + ei;t (3.1)
idi;t = 
0Banki;t 1 + dt + vi + !i;t (3.2)
with the number of banks i = 1,. . . ,N and the number of observations per bank t = 1,. . . ,T.17
17 The panel is unbalanced because some banks fail, some merge, and some are founded during the sample period.
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The left-hand side variables are, respectively, the rst difference of the log of deposits held by
bank i at time t, and the (implicit) real interest rate paid on those deposits. Banki;t 1 is a vector
of bank-specic variables assumed exogenous and included with a quarterly lag to account for the
fact that nancial reports are not instantaneously made available to the public. Time dummies, dt,
control for macroeconomic shocks that inuence the banking system as a whole.18 And we allow
for unobserved bank heterogeneity by introducing a bank-specic, time-invariant effect, vi. The
error terms, ei;t and !i;t, are assumed to be independently distributed with mean zero and variance
2i;t.
In both models 3.1 and 3.2, observing the coefcient estimates for the bank-specic variables
provides the basis for tests of market discipline. Generally speaking, we look for statistically
signicant associations between those variables that measure a bank's capacity for responding to
deposit withdrawals and its subsequent net deposit ows and deposit rates. All else equal, weaker
banks are described as subject to market discipline if they experience less net growth in deposits
or if they pay higher deposit rates. Depositors, that is, are presumed to react to the observed
weakness by either (a) channeling monies away from weaker institutions or (b) requiring a deposit
rate premium as compensation. The two dependent variables provide a more comprehensive test
of market discipline than relying upon just one (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001).19
The data allow us to explore the impact of a nancial crisis on market discipline by estimating
model 3.1 for periods before and after the August 1998 ruble devaluation and sovereign debt
repudiation. By splitting the post-crisis data into sub-periods, we check whether the documented
effects remain stable over time. We also test the relationship between depositor identity and
18 Controlling for time dummies in the models is equivalent to including all variables in deviations from their
time-specic means. Consider model (1). In such a specication, risk measures do not affect the average deposit
growth in the banking sector but rather the bank-specic deviations from that average. As long as banks maintain
stronger than average fundamentals they enjoy higher than average deposit growth by stealing deposits from weak
banks.
19 Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) note that using net deposit ows alone may not allow distinctions to be drawn
between market and regulatory discipline. That is, regulatory pressure on under-capitalized banks could result in a
bank deciding to reduce both its assets and liabilities, accomplishing the latter through reduced deposit rates.
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market discipline by estimating separate models for both the deposits held by and the deposit rates
paid to non-bank rms, households and banks. And last, we run the models both inclusive and
exclusive of banks that are state owned or are pocket banks who gear lending activity to owners
or company insiders.20 With respect to all versions, we report within (xed effects) or pooled
estimates depending on whether the xed effects are jointly signicant.
We employ a new and separate model to test for sophisticated discipline in which the deposit
rate itself serves as a complementary proxy of institutional stability. As such, rate increases
amount to more than a means to attract deposits or offer compensation for increased risk, ceteris
paribus. They are interpreted, as well, as coincident with an increase in risk not reected in
other observed measures (Hellman et al., 1998, 2000). If higher deposit rates, particularly in
combination with other risk measures (e.g., low capitalization), are so interpreted, the effect of
raising interest rates on the volume of deposits supplied will not necessarily be positive. The
deposit supply curve, that is, may be backward bending.
We directly estimate the supply function employing the following two specications:
Di;t = 
0Banki;t 1 + 1idi;t + 2(i
d
i;t)
2 + dt + vi + "i;t (3.3)
Di;t = 
0Banki;t 1+1idi;t+2(i
d
i;t)
2+3i
d
i;t(1 Capi;t 1)+4idi;t(1 Capi;t 1)2+dt+vi+"i;t
(3.4)
where the real deposit rate, , its square and its interaction with a measure of bank capitalization,
(with representing the capital-assets ratio) and its square, are included to test for the joint effect
20 Small sample size prevents us from doing a meaningful analysis for the group of state-owned banks alone. In many
emerging market economies, depositors' willingness and ability to monitor banks is inuenced by the presence of
large state-owned and/or foreign-owned banks. The deposits of the former often carry an implicit, if not explicit,
insurance guarantee. And foreign banks may be recognized as already being exposed to discipline by the international
markets on which their debt and equity trade (Caprio and Honohan, 2004). Relative to its level of development,
however, Russia (during our period of analysis) had neither a relatively large state nor foreign-owned banking sector
(Barth et al., 2006). In 2001, for example, over half of the banking system's assets were held at privately owned,
domestic banks.
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of price and risk measures and for the hypothesized backward-bending supply curve. Banki;t 1
is a vector of exogenous supply shifters  the same as employed in models 3.1 and 3.2, with the
exception being that we exclude those regressors that had been either consistently insignicant or
unstable and rarely signicant in the prior estimations.
Our identication strategy (i.e., the choice of instruments for the endogenous deposit rate)
relies on the assumption that a bank's demand for deposits is affected by the risk-return prole of
its available investment opportunities. Since a bank's average lending rate reects this risk-return
prole, we regard the rate as a determinant of its demand for deposits.21 On the other hand, it
is difcult to fathom how lending rates would enter into depositors' supply decision. Although
consumer lending rates are often advertised, consumer lending represented less than ve percent
of total bank loans during the period analyzed.22 Of course, depositors could access the same data
used here to calculate, with a lag, average lending rates. Though arguably possible, it would seem
improbable that depositors actually use this approach to evaluate a bank's stability. Nevertheless,
in unreported robustness tests, we included the lagged average (implicit) lending rate and found it
entered the supply function regressions with a highly insignicant coefcient and had no impact
on our main results.
We employ the Difference Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM) proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). Terms involving the deposit rate are treated as endogenous. The
bank's average (implicit) lending rate, its square, as well as suitably lagged values of endogenous
variables are used as instruments. We employ the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation to test the validity of the
chosen instruments. Finally, we split banks into sub-samples of small and large banks and check
21 Considering the effect of the average (implicit) lending rate and the total demand for deposits, it is unclear to what
extent it works through the demand for deposits of households, rms and/or banks. This uncertainty makes the
overall average lending rate a weaker instrument for the implicit deposit rates that apply to actors of a particular type
(i.e., households, rms or banks). Therefore, we estimate the supply function for all deposits together.
22 See Berezanskaya (2003) for some further anecdotal evidence.
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whether the documented effects depend on bank size.
3.4 Data and Variables
All banks are required to disclose their nancial statements to the Central Bank of Russia
(CBR). Balance sheet information and prot and loss accounts are reported, respectively, on
monthly and quarterly bases and are made available to the public through several channels.
Since 1999, the nancial statements of most banks have been posted on the website of the CBR
(www.cbr.ru). Banks publish their balances in the nancial press such as the monthly nancial
periodical Den'gi i Kredit. Private information agencies, moreover, in cooperation with the CBR,
gather raw, bank-specic accounting data to generate standardized nancial indicators. Some of
this processed data is made available for free (e.g. online at www.banks-rate.ru), whereas the most
detailed information can only be accessed through fee-based channels.
The bank data used in the analysis here were made available to the authors by two established
and highly respected private nancial information agencies, Interfax and Mobile.23 The former
provides quarterly measures of bank balances and prot and loss accounts as well as bank-specic
scores on a battery of regulatory standards from 1999 through 2002. The latter offers bank
balances on a monthly basis from mid-1995 through 2002 and prot and loss accounts on
a quarterly basis from October 2000 through 2002. As the prot and loss data are required
for constructing implicit interest rates and efciency ratios, we limit our analysis to quarterly
observations. The absence of prot and loss data before 1999 inhibits us from investigating price
discipline prior to that year.
We merge quarterly observations of the two datasets (both expressed in rubles) by date and
bank registration number. For those cases in which a bank merged or was acquired, we treat the
resulting larger bank as new from the standpoint of our sample. However, given the requisite
23 For more information on these rms, see their respective websites at www.interfax.ru and www.mobile.ru. Karas and
Schoors (2005) provide a detailed description of the datasets and conrm the consistency of different data sources.
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differencing and lagging in our analysis, this requires dropping at least the rst two observations
for this new bank. To avoid this loss of data, we sum up the nancial statements of the two
merging banks for the two quarters preceding the merger and use those merged accounts as the
needed lags.24
The bank-specic variables used in this paper include deposits and interest rates as well as
measures of risk, performance and balance sheet structure. The average implicit interest rate that
a bank offers on its deposits has been calculated by dividing interest expenses during a particular
period by the corresponding level of deposits (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001).25 Since our
dataset disaggregates both interest expenses and deposits by the legal status of the depositor, the
variables measuring deposit ows and interest rates can be constructed separately for non-bank
rms, households and banks. Similar procedures were used to compute the implicit lending rate.
As depositors are hypothesized to react to observable data, we consider bank-specic measures
of risk and performance that can be easily constructed using publicly available information (e.g.,
online at www.banks-rate.ru). Other, more sophisticated measures suggested in the literature
could either not be constructed from the available data or did not exist on a comprehensive basis
(e.g., bank ratings) over the sample period (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Sironi, 2003).
Capitalization, measured as the ratio of capital over assets, is expected to be positively
associated with the subsequent growth of real deposits and inversely related to the next quarter's
deposit rates. As much as any single measure of bank stability, it has been shown to serve as the
basis for market discipline by depositors (Cook and Spellman, 1994; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988;
Park and Peristiani, 1998; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga,
24 Given the relatively small number of mergers and acquisitions (30) in comparison to the number of banks in our
sample (about 1500), we do not expect that a different treatment of mergers would have a signicant impact on our
results.
25 Taking into account the imperfect nature of such a measure, we had to drop unreasonable values and outliers to
prevent them from driving our regression results. Given the high interest rates after the 1998 crisis we decided to treat
all rates below 50% as reasonable. Other cut-off points were examined as well, but the regression results always
remained qualitatively unchanged.
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2004).
In general, one would expect liquidity to have the same effect as capitalization with respect
to market discipline. Highly liquid banks, that is, should be considered more capable of
accommodating unexpected withdrawals (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga, 2004). We therefore expect a bank's current liquidity ratio  i.e., the sum of its
liquid assets divided by the sum of its liabilities on demand accounts and accounts up to 30 days 
to be positively associated with deposit growth and negatively with interest rates, ceteris paribus.
The relationship of market disciplining behavior and a second measure of liquidity, excess
reserves (relative to assets) deposited with the central bank, is not a priori clear. In a more mature
market economy, we might expect excess reserves to measure the capacity to meet the demand for
deposit withdrawals. We should consider, however, that Russian banks engaging in speculative
activities and wishing to conceal the nature of their business often clear their position and park
their monies with the CBR when the accounts are closed. High excess reserves may thus be
related to greater risk and thus lower deposit growth and higher deposit rates. It is also possible
that high excess reserves may be a function more of problems in the payment system than a desire
to maintain excess liquidity for deposit withdrawals (Schoors, 2001).
Controls are also included for measures that directly capture bank performance. Higher
returns relative to assets, we would expect, will increase the stability of deposit institutions and
make them less prone to market disciplining (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). Moreover,
the change in a bank's share of non-performing loans, a measure of a bank's most recent risk
management practices, should be inversely related to deposit growth and positively associated
with interest rates (Cook and Spellman, 1994; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; and Park and
Peristani, 1998).
We also take into account efciency considerations by controlling for operational costs relative
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to bank size. If we were to assume a homogenous level of service quality across banks, higher
personnel expenses as a share of assets should be related to more sanctioning actions. Less
cost-effective banks, that is, should be perceived as less stable and, thus, more prone to deposit
outows or pressure to raise deposit rates. On the other hand, since most Russian banks have
been known to operate with poorly trained staffs, higher personnel costs may be interpreted as
associated with a higher level of human capital and, thus, better asset management and a more
stable institution. The expected sign, therefore, is not clear.
Variables capturing balance sheet structure are included as controls as well. Although the
literature does not generally consider them as proxies for stability or performance in studies of
market discipline, it is at least possible that, ceteris paribus, they could be interpreted as such.
In this respect, the expected sign for loans to non-banks as a share of assets is not a priori clear,
in part because we cannot distinguish loans either by risk or maturity. A high share of loans to
non-banks could either signal greater credit risk or indicate a greater predisposition to engage in
more traditional and, perhaps, less speculative activities. The relationship between lending to
households as a share of all loans is similarly ambiguous. On the one hand, few Russians have
well-developed credit records, making lending to them a risky proposition. However, loans to
households may have shorter maturities and thus expose lenders to less liquidity risk.
Controls for the structure of bank liabilities are also included. Term deposits as a share of all
non-bank claims partly capture the maturity structure of liabilities. Banks capable of attracting
time deposits have effectively had their stability certied by previous depositors, thus making
them potentially less prone to market discipline. However, since term deposits tend to command
higher interest rates than demand deposits, the relationship between this variable and the standard
form of price-based market discipline is not altogether clear. Growth in term deposits, all else
equal, will produce higher payments to depositors. But to the extent that this growth is interpreted
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as a signal of depositor-conferred stability, we would expect there to be downward pressure on
any deposit risk premium. We thus do not have a clear expectation as to the sign on this variable.
Table C.1 summarizes our predictions for the signs of the coefcients on the right-hand side
variables. Table C.2 presents summary statistics for all banks included in our sample. Deposit
growth, interest rates and return on assets are all expressed in real terms using Consumer Price
Index data from the CBR.26 Deposit growth has been positive across all three depositor types but
has been fastest over this period among households. As is apparent in rows 5 to 8, rm deposits
represent the largest share of bank liabilities, followed by those of households and then banks.
The negative values of implicit real interest rates in Table C.2 are consistent with the CBR's data
on ination and announced nominal deposit and lending rates. The lowest implicit real interest
rates are paid on rms' deposits, whereas the highest are paid on inter-bank funds.
There are 155 banks in our sample that report negative capital at least once during the period
under consideration, with most of these cases occurring in the aftermath of the 1998 nancial
crisis. Table C.3 presents the summary statistics for the pre- and the post-crisis periods separately.
The standard deviation of key variables  e.g., capitalization and liquidity  is comparable across
these periods.
As was noted in the previous section, we check the robustness of our empirical results by
performing all estimations both with and without state-owned as well as pocket banks. Because
of their access (real or presumed) to public resources, the former are generally believed to provide
depositors with weak incentives for monitoring and disciplining (Caprio and Honohan, 2004; Nier
and Baumann, 2006). Indeed, in Russia, state-owned banks have enjoyed a number of advantages
over their private competitors, including privileged access to state funds, de facto exemption from
some regulatory standards, and during the entirety of the period covered by our data, explicit
26 Since ination is not observable ex ante, we have to approximate the real return investors expect to earn on their
deposits by the realized real rate ex post. Assuming rational actors with optimal ination forecasts, however, any
forecast errors  i.e., differences between expected and realized ination  should be constant across actors and
should be largely captured by time dummies in the regressions.
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backing for their retail deposits (Tompson, 2004). For the purposes of our analysis, we can
distinguish between two types of state-owned banks in Russia, those owned by the CBR and those
owned by federal or regional authorities or other government entities.27 The former (Sberbank,
Vneshtorgbank and Vnesheconombank) have enjoyed the full and consistent backing of the CBR
and so, considering them less likely to have been subject to market discipline, are excluded from
our sample. The second group, however, includes institutions that have been allowed to fail (e.g.,
Unikombank, Soto-bank, Trade-bank), although the state formally guarantees their household
deposits (Civil Code of Russia, article 840). We include these banks in the estimations since they
may well have been disciplined by other depositor classes.28
To identify pocket banks, which have geared their lending activities heavily toward owners
and insiders, we use two regulatory standards: owner exposure (the aggregate amount of credits
and loans extended to the bank's shareholders or partners) and insider exposure (the aggregate
amount of credits and loans extended to employees and managers).29 The respective legal
thresholds that are not to be exceeded are 50% and 3% of the bank's equity capital. First, we
dene an institution as a pocket bank if during our sample period it violates each of these two
standards at least once. However, the number of banks identied by this procedure, roughly forty,
is small. Considering, moreover, that banks might manipulate their books in order to satisfy these
regulatory standards, we relaxed the denition by reducing the thresholds to 66% (denition
1) and further to 33% (denition 2) of the respective legal thresholds. We thus characterize an
institution as a pocket bank if, during our sample period, it breaches each of these revised
thresholds at least once.
3.5 Results
We lay out our main results in two sections. First, we present and discuss the standard market
27 The list of state-owned banks was compiled from Sherif et al. (2003), Matovnikov (2002) and Mamontov (2005).
28 Their exclusion however does not alter the results.
29 For the ofcial denition of these and other regulatory standards, see Bank of Russia Instruction No.1 of October 1,
1997, On Bank Regulation Procedure (an English version is available at www.cbr.ru).
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discipline model, examining how measures of bank risk in one quarter relate to the subsequent
quarter's net deposit ows and interest payments. In a second section, we test whether depositors
interpret deposit rates as complementing standard measures of bank risk. To save space, the tables
report only the variables of economic interest, not the time dummies.
3.5.1 Market discipline and depositor type
This section presents our ndings as to whether or not we observe standard forms of market
discipline behavior in Russia. Table C.4 displays estimation results for the deposit ow model 3.1
for the pre-crisis period (April 1997  July 1998), the post-crisis period (October 1999  January
2003) and 6 sub-periods after the crisis. In broad terms, the results conrm the presence of
market discipline. Most notably, a higher capital-assets ratio and greater liquidity predict greater
net deposit inows in the subsequent period. Although these ndings hold up both before and
after the 1998 crisis, discipline exercised in response to these variables seems to have increased
substantially in its aftermath.30 This result is consistent with the proposition that crises breed
greater depositor vigilance (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). Further, the relationship
between deposit ows and these two measures of bank risk is shown to be robust across all
post-crisis sub-periods.
We also see evidence in support of the presence of market discipline both before and after
the crisis in the negative and statistically signicant correlation between deposit growth and the
increase in non-performing loans. This relationship, however, is not as strong as the ndings for
capitalization and liquidity and is shown not to be robust to the segmentation of periods after
1998. And, interestingly, return on assets is not consistently correlated with net deposit inows
after the crisis, even though it was before. It is possible that Russian depositors have learned not
to put too much weight on the protability rates posted by Russian banks. Indeed, Malyutina and
30 As suggested by the data in Table C.3, the difference between the pre- and post-crisis results is not a function of a
change in the variance of the explanatory variables.
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Parilova (2001) note that It has already become a conventional wisdom that ofcial gures for
prots of Russian banks are the most manipulated and thus unreliable ones.
We should note, as well, that after the crisis excess reserves with the CBR are negatively
associated with deposit inows, which suggests that it might be interpreted as a proxy for a riskier
asset management strategy. Moreover, one balance sheet structure variable  loans to non-bank
rms as a share of total assets  was statistically insignicant before the 1998 crisis but becomes
signicant and positive in its aftermath. This latter nding is also at least consistent with the
proposition that depositors feel safer with banks appearing to engage in more traditional and,
perhaps, less speculative investment activities. Finally, we observe banks that pay their personnel
more, ceteris paribus, are more successful in attracting funds.
In Table C.5, we lay out the results for the model that uses the deposit rate as the dependent
variable. In terms of providing evidence for market discipline, the results are clearly weaker than
those noted in Table C.4. Although the negative signs on the capitalization and liquidity measures
are what we would expect if depositor discipline were present, the statistical signicance of
these associations is not strong and does not hold up to the decomposition across sub-periods.
Specically, there is no evidence that weakly capitalized banks pay higher interest rates to
depositors as compensation. We also nd only weak evidence that depositors accept higher
interest rates in return for lower liquidity. Finally, we do not see any signicant relationship
between the dependent variable and either the bank's protability or its increase in non-performing
loans. The relatively high explanatory power of the regressions is largely due to time dummies. In
sum, our results strongly conrm the presence of quantity discipline but offer little to no support
for the standard form of price discipline.
In Table C.6, we repeat the main equations of Tables C.4 and C.5 for the three depositor types:
non-bank rms, households and banks. The results conrming quantity discipline, particularly
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in the post-crisis period, appear to be driven most strongly by the behavior of rms. As can be
observed, rm deposits are much more sensitive to liquidity, the change in loan quality and the
capital-assets ratio than those of households or banks. Households, however, do display some
sensitivity to each of these measures, particularly in the post-crisis period. As depositors in other
institutions, banks are shown to be responsive to capitalization in the post-crisis period but little
else.
Disaggregated by depositor legal status, the results for the standard form of price discipline
are, again, not as strong. Table C.6 demonstrates only weak and sporadic associations between
increased bank risk and the demands of rms, households or banks for compensation in the form
of higher deposit rates. Only among rms (but not households or banks), do we observe a negative
and statistically signicant association between capitalization and subsequent deposit rates. And
only among households and banks (but not rms), do we see a similar relationship between these
rates and liquidity. And, notably, with respect to non-performing loans and protability, we do not
observe any evidence for the standard form of price discipline among any of the depositor types.
We include Table C.7 to demonstrate the general robustness of our results to the exclusion
of state banks and pocket banks, variously dened. Most notably, capitalization and liquidity
remain strong predictors of deposit ows but, at most, only weak predictors of subsequent interest
rates.
3.5.2 Sophisticated discipline
Among studies of deposit market discipline, our nding of strong evidence for quantity
disciplining but weak support for the standard form of price discipline stands out as unique.
But, as we noted earlier, this result should not be interpreted, in and of itself, as suggesting
that market discipline is weak. Indeed, our nding is consistent with a different, perhaps more
sophisticated, form of price discipline in which deposit rates represent more than just a mechanism
for competing for funds and compensating depositors for observable risk.
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We now explore the manner in which deposit rates might complement other variables that
capture a bank's prospects for honoring its liabilities. Specically, we ask whether these rates are
interpreted as a signal of bank stability (Hellman et al., 1998 and 2000). If they are, we should not
expect there to be a clear positive relationship between the rates a bank posts and its subsequent
ability to attract deposits, perhaps especially for banks already viewed as weak with respect to
other measures, such as capitalization.
Table C.8 presents estimations of the deposit supply function, using specications 3.3 and
3.4. We rst report results for all banks, then inclusive of just non-state banks and non-pocket
banks, variously dened. Both specications 3.3 and 3.4 allow for a non-linear relationship
between interest rates and deposits such that after a certain switching point the slope of the
supply curve can change sign. In specication 3.4, the interest rate is interacted with capitalization
to investigate whether the price elasticity of deposit supply is sensitive to an observed measure
of bank risk (Hellman et al., 1998 and 2000). All reported equations pass both the Hansen test
of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation at
conventional signicance levels.
The results in Table C.8 demonstrate a non-linear interest rate effect in the columns that
represent specication 3.3, suggesting an implied switching point of six percent, above which
increases in real interest rates produce negative returns with respect to deposit attraction.31 In
addition, in the columns that represent specication 3.4, we observe a joint effect of interest rates
and capitalization on deposit growth. The implied switching point of roughly twelve percent
appears stable across sample denitions. Both the independent and interaction effects of interest
rates and bank capitalization can be viewed in Figures D.1 and D.2, which show the deposit
growth plane in the interest rate/capitalization space, evaluated at the average values of the other
independent variables. Figure D.1 shows the results for all banks in our sample and Figure D.2
31 Roughly two percent of all observations (339 of 16518) are above this switching point.
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shows them for banks that are neither state-owned nor pocket banks. At low and intermediate
interest rate levels, a bank's deposit growth in response to interest rate hikes is positively
correlated with bank capitalization. Moreover, higher capitalization is positively correlated with
the switching point beyond which interest rate increases produce negative returns with respect to
deposit attraction.
This evidence is consistent with depositors growing suspicious as interest rates rise. Their
suspicion, moreover, that interest rate hikes might reect new sources of bank risk, not otherwise
observed, is sensitive to an observed measure that all our results have suggested is important
to market disciplining behavior  i.e., capitalization. In other words, the evidence suggests that
if depositors are condent in a bank's ability to meet deposit withdrawals, on the basis of its
capital-assets ratio, they are more apt to view its rate increases as coincident with increases in the
expected return on their deposits and, thus, increase their supply of deposits accordingly. But a
bank which already has given depositors reason for suspicion, due to its lower capitalization, does
not have the same ability to translate its increase in deposit rates into a corresponding increase in
the expected returns and, thus, the deposits of its depositors.
Table C.9 demonstrates that our results are not driven by size effects. We split the sample
into two sub-samples  the smallest 80% and the largest 20%  and re-estimate specication 3.3
for both. Although large banks' deposits are less sensitive to capitalization and liquidity than
the deposits of small banks, both sub-samples show evidence of more sophisticated discipline.
Small banks exhibit an implied switching point of ve percent while large banks enjoy a higher
switching point of eleven percent, above which increases in real interest rates produce negative
returns with respect to deposit attraction. Figure D.3 shows deposit growth as a function of the
deposit rate for large and small banks respectively, evaluated at the average values of the other
independent variables. At low interest rates deposits of small banks grow faster than those of large
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banks, but this deposit growth reaches a turning point if real interest rates exceed ve percent.
The lines cross at a real rate of about nine percent, above which the deposit growth of large banks
really dominates the deposit growth of small banks.
One might well question the logic of the backward bending deposit supply curve since it might
appear to be at odds with prot-maximizing behavior. If there are two interest rates that generate
the same deposit inow, why would a bank ever choose the higher one? We should recall here
that in a nascent market environment, it is not unreasonable to expect that bank managers will still
be learning about the nature of depositors' deposit supply function, particularly given its possible
re-orientation in the aftermath of severe nancial crises. In other words, given banks' imperfect
information about what this function looks like, their behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with
rationality.
3.6 Conclusion
Even though the deposit market in Russia is young and its supporting institutional /
informational infrastructure is relatively immature, the country's depositors have developed the
capacity to identify and discipline weaker banks. Banks net deposit inows, specically, have
been shown to be highly sensitive to measures of bank capitalization, liquidity and changes in loan
quality, particularly after the nancial crisis of 1998. Quantity disciplining, moreover, appears to
have been driven primarily by the behavior of non-bank rms and, to a lesser extent, households.
This nding is consistent with rm managers having greater knowledge of the relevant banking
data and its meaning. Nevertheless, the evidence that households have developed a capacity for
disciplining banks is noteworthy and may in part be a reection of their experience with bank
failures earlier in the country's post-communist transition.
The strong presence of quantity discipline and the relative absence of price discipline, at
least as traditionally conceived, present us with a combination of ndings not observed in prior
studies. Rather than interpreting the latter as weakening the case for market discipline, we view
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it as consistent with a more subtle form of discipline than that which has been explored in other
contexts. Indeed, we observe that the supply of deposits is highly sensitive to deposit rates and,
importantly, that increases in those rates ultimately produce a decrease in deposit inows. This
effect, moreover, is particularly pronounced for banks already viewed as weak because of their
low capitalization. The deposit rate, thus, appears to be viewed by depositors not solely as a
bank's promised payment for funds but also as a proxy for otherwise unobservable risk. It is
at least conceivable that because a subset of bank managers have yet to fully understand this
interpretation, some banks may continue to raise their rates only to see their stock of deposits
decline.
In terms of reduced market discipline and subsequent moral hazard incentives, our results do
suggest a real cost as Russia now moves forward with the introduction of widespread deposit
insurance. But more generally, given the doubt that has been expressed as to whether depositors
in nascent markets will be both willing and able to discipline the banks entrusted with their funds,
our ndings offer support for the proposition that markets and market actors develop mechanisms
and strategies to mitigate market failures with greater speed than perhaps initially thought. We
should remember, however, that the post-communist experience with bank failures has imposed
great costs across Russian society and effectively forced depositors to become the relatively quick
learners and sophisticated discipliners that can now be observed in these data.
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Appendix C Tables
Table C.1: Empirical Predictions
Bank-specic explanatory variables Expected sign in the equation for:
Deposit growth Deposit rate
Capital / Total assets + -
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities + -
Change in loan quality - +
Return on assets + -
Excess reserves / Total assets ? ?
Loans to non-banks / Total assets ? ?
Loans to households / Loans to non-banks ? ?
Term deposits / Total deposits + ?
Personnel expenses / Total assets ? ?
Deposit rate + Not included
Deposit rate^2 - Not included
72
Table C.2: Summary Statistics: 1997-2002
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total deposit growth 26023 0,03 0,61 -7,73 12,96
Firm deposit growth 26011 0,03 0,72 -8,83 9,18
Household deposit growth 24187 0,05 0,89 -9,63 12,14
Bank deposit growth 9497 0 1,2 -13,06 12,91
Total deposits / Total assets 26023 0,4 0,2 0 0,98
Firm deposits / Total assets 26023 0,27 0,18 0 0,97
Household deposits / Total assets 26023 0,09 0,09 0 0,76
Bank deposits / Total assets 26023 0,05 0,1 0 0,93
Interest rate on total deposits 16858 -0,02 0,03 -0,07 0,44
Interest rate on rm deposits 16517 -0,03 0,02 -0,07 0,44
Interest rate on household deposits 15150 0 0,07 -0,07 0,48
Interest rate on bank deposits 7134 0,01 0,07 -0,07 0,46
Interest rate on total loans 16402 0,01 0,05 -0,07 0,45
Interest rate on rm loans 16263 0,01 0,05 -0,07 0,43
Interest rate on household loans 15038 0,02 0,06 -0,07 0,43
Interest rate on bank loans 8238 0,02 0,09 -0,07 0,47
Capital / Total assets 26023 0,28 0,2 -0,87 0,99
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities 26023 0,63 0,79 0 9,99
Bad loans / Total loans 26023 0,05 0,13 0 1
Return on assets 26023 -0,03 0,03 -0,5 0,93
Excess reserves / Total assets 26023 0,1 0,12 0 0,96
Loans to non-banks / Total assets 26023 0,41 0,2 0 0,99
Loans to households / Loans to non-banks 26023 0,12 0,19 0 1
Term deposits / Total deposits 26023 0,31 0,25 0 1
Personnel expenses / Total assets 16954 0,01 0,01 0 0,26
Note: The table presents the summary statistics of the bank-specic variables with each observation representing a measure for a
single bank in a specic quarter. Only observations used in at least one of the regressions are included.
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Table C.9: Supply of Total Deposits: Split by Total Assets
Post-crisis
Explanatory Variables Small banks Big banks
Capital / Total assets 2,118 1,967
t-statistic 12,71 7,13
Liquid assets / Demand liabilities 0,244 0,013
t-statistic 6,42 0,24
Change in loan quality -0,946 0,864
t-statistic -3,66 1,21
Excess reserves / Total assets -1,541 -1,059
t-statistic -12,9 -4,13
Loans to non-banks / Total assets 0,677 0,293
t-statistic 4,45 1,1
Term deposits / Total deposits 0,278 0,46
t-statistic 2,25 2,52
Personnel expenses / Total assets 13,562 21,541
t-statistic 4,81 4,56
Interest rate 10,998 12,751
t-statistic 2,05 1,74
Interest rate^2 -103,078 -56,008
t-statistic -2,39 -3,09
Number of observations 13215 3304
Number of banks 1194 382
AR(2) p-value 0,38 0,17
Hansen test p-value 0,16 0,81
Implied switching point 0,05 0,11
Note: The table reports regression results of the growth of total deposits on bank risk characteristics, the deposit rate and
deposit rate squared for different sub-samples of banks. The Difference GMM estimator is used. Terms involving deposit
rate are treated as endogenous. Lending rate, its square and suitably lagged values of endogenous variables are used as
instruments. Estimates for time dummies are not reported. Robust t-statistics are in italics. The 2nd order autocorrelation
test tests the null hypothesis of no 2nd order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. The Hansen test tests the validity
of over-identifying restrictions and is robust to heteroscedasticity. Only results for the post-crisis period are reported due
to the data limitations.
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Appendix D Figures
Note for Figures D.1, D.2 and D.3: based on the estimated supply function for different interest rates and capitalisation the
gures show implied deposit growth. Other regressors are assumed constant and are taken at their average values. Figure D.1 refers
to Table C.8, specication for all banks; Figure D.2 refers to Table C.8, specication for non-insider banks based on denition 2;
Figure D.3 refers to Table C.9.
Figure D.1: Implied Deposit Growth in the Deposit Rate  Capital Space
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Figure D.2: Implied Deposit Growth in the Deposit RateCapital Space
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Figure D.3: Implied Deposit Growth: Split by Bank Size
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Chapter 4 Are private banks more efcient than public banks? Evidence from Russia
4.1 Introduction
This paper assesses the efciency of the nascent Russian banking system. The central question
we pose is whether bank ownership has any effect on bank efciency in Russia. We distinguish
between foreign-owned banks (foreign banks), privately owned banks (private banks) and
state-owned banks (public banks). We nd that foreign banks are more efcient than domestic
private banks and  surprisingly  that domestic private banks are not more efcient than domestic
public banks. These results are not driven by differences in activity mix, risk preferences or bank
environment, nor by the absence of explicit deposit insurance for domestic private banks.
Transition countries appear to be fertile testing grounds for comparative analysis of public and
private banks' efciency, but rst appearances can be deceiving. Indeed, this comparative analysis
failed to yield clear answers because in most countries foreign entry and bank privatization
went hand in hand. As a consequence the empirical results for these countries were largely
interpreted in terms of efciency gaps between foreign and domestic ownership rather than
between public and private ownership. In Russia however partial bank privatization was achieved
relatively quickly, while foreign bank entry remained at a relatively low level in the rst 15 years
of transition . Still, partial public ownership in various forms remained a robust characteristic
of the Russian banking sector throughout the transition.32 The Central Bank of Russia (CBR)
has played an important role through the commercial banks under its direct control, namely
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank. In addition, government bodies at several levels own banks. There
are examples of villages, provinces, cities, federal bodies and state rms in this position. For
32 The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) repeatedly showed its eagerness to restrict foreign entry to the banking sector.
The Association of Russian Banks has consistently lobbied the government to limit foreign bank entry using the
classic infant industry protection argument. Russia was ultimately forced to commit itself to a gradual opening of its
nancial market to foreign competition because of its desire to enter the WTO.
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October 2001 for example, we nd that the 27 banks that are majority owned by state bodies
(out of 1277 banks in total) control 53% of banking assets and 39% of banking liabilities.
Neglecting the CBR's commercial banking activities through Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank., the
remaining 25 public banks hold no less than 6% of total banking assets and 8% of total banking
liabilities. The Russian banking industry therefore presents us with the exceptional opportunity
to disentangle efciency differences between foreign, public and private banks for a sufciently
large number of banks. This study therefore complements the literature on foreign ownership and
efciency in emerging market economies and its conclusions contribute to our understanding of
emerging-market-economy banking sectors.
Efciency comparisons between public and private banks are cumbersome in emerging market
economies because the two types of banks operate in different institutional environments; for
example the implicit full deposit insurance typically enjoyed by public banks does not cover
private banks. Any differences found in cost effectiveness between private and public banks
may therefore be attributable to this difference in deposit insurance, which may render public
banks' access to deposits less costly in terms of labor and physical capital. In Russia too, public
banks were always covered, albeit implicitly, by deposit insurance, while household deposits
held at private banks have been covered by deposit insurance only since 2004. To control for
this we perform our estimations for two sub-samples, one before (2002) and one after (2006) the
introduction of deposit insurance for household deposits at private banks. This allows us to assess
whether any difference in efciency may be partly attributable to differences in deposit insurance
and whether the more level playing eld of generalized deposit insurance for household deposits
effectively reduces the efciency difference.
In the following section we overview the bank efciency literature related to our study. Section
4.3 presents the recent history of the Russian banking sector. This is followed by an overview of
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the data in section 4.4 and the estimation methodology in section 4.5. Section 4.6 lays out the
main results. Section 4.7 provides further robustness checks by repeating the analysis for a size
-matched sample and employing a very different econometric approach. We end with concluding
remarks in section 4.8.
4.2 Related literature
The empirical literature on privatization in transition countries has found that the method and
timing of privatization are related to its performance effects. Frydman et al. (1999) nd that
privatization has no benecial effect on performance if rms fall under the sway of insider owners
(managers or employees), while the positive performance effect is pronounced if the rm is
privatized to outsider owners. Brown et al. (2006) document that foreign privatization has larger
productivity effects than domestic privatization in a set of four transition countries.
There is also ample evidence for transition countries that foreign rms are more efcient than
domestic rms, be it in the banking sector or in other sectors. Foreign banks may be more efcient
than domestic ones because of their more advanced technology, superior management practices,
superior access to capital or implicit deposit insurance via the deep pockets of the foreign mother
bank.
These economy-wide results are sustained by more detailed banking sector studies that apply
stochastic frontier models. Weill (2003) shows in a study of the Czech Republic and Poland
that foreign-owned banks are indeed more efcient than domestic-owned banks and that this is
driven neither by differences in bank size nor by differences in the structure of activities. Hasan
and Marton (2003) nd in a Hungarian country-study that foreign banks were more efcient
already in the period 1993-1997, early in transition. Fries and Taci (2005), in a study of 15 East
European transition countries (including Russia), nd that private banks are more cost efcient
than state-owned banks. This conrms the result of Weill (2003) that privatized banks with
majority foreign ownership are the most cost efcient. These are followed by newly established
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private banks, both domestic and foreign owned, and nally by privatized banks with majority
domestic ownership, though these are still more efcient than state-owned banks. Bonin et al.
(2005a) analyze the effects of ownership on bank efciency for a set of eleven transition countries
for the period 1996-2000. They apply a stochastic frontier approach to compute bank-specic
efciency scores and relate these to ownership in second-stage regressions. Foreign-owned banks
are again conrmed to be more cost-efcient and to collect more deposits and grant more loans
than other banks. The magnitude of increased efciency from foreign ownership is 6% or higher.
State-owned banks are not appreciably less efcient than de novo domestic private banks, but they
are clearly less efcient than those already privatized, which supports the idea that better banks
were privatized rst. In a companion paper with comparable methodology, Bonin et al. (2005b)
analyze whether the method and timing of bank privatization affect bank efciency. They nd that
voucher privatization does not lead to increased efciency and early-privatized banks are more
efcient than later-privatized banks.
Kraft, Hoer and Payne (2006) study the Croatian banking system and nd that new private
and privatized banks are not more efcient than public banks and that privatization does not
immediately improve efciency, while foreign banks are substantially more efcient than all
domestic banks.
A number of studies apply data envelopment analysis to examine bank efciency in Central
and Eastern Europe. These include for example Grigorian and Manole (2006), who study 17
European transition countries, Jemric and Vujcic (2002), who look at Croatia, and Havrylchyk
(2006), who studies Poland. In accordance with the ndings of the stochastic frontier literature, all
these studies nd that foreign banks are more efcient than domestic ones. Grigorian and Manole
(2006) nd in addition that privatization does not automatically lead to higher efciency, which is
in line with Bonin et al. (2005a). This superior efciency of foreign banks is however not always
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found in other emerging market economies. Sensarma (2006) nds that in India foreign banks are
less efcient than either public or private domestic banks.
Two studies investigate bank efciency in Russia. Fries and Taci (2005) study the cost
efciency of banks from 15 post-communist countries including Russia, between 1994 and 2001.
They apply the one-stage Battese-Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier model and nd that foreign
ownership and private ownership are both associated with greater efciency. Their ndings,
however, are based on a cross-country sample and so need not hold equally for every country.
This observation holds particularly for Russia, given their very limited sample of Russian banks
(48 out of more than 1000 existing banks).
Styrin (2005) solves these problems by using a large dataset of Russian banks obtained from
the Central Bank of Russia for the period 1999-2002. While efciency scores are estimated
in a rst stage using the stochastic frontier approach, they are regressed on a set of potential
determinants, including public ownership and foreign ownership, in a second stage. Public
ownership is innovatively dened as actual afliation with the state as measured by the ratio of
interest income received from the government to total interest income. This paper concludes in
favor of a greater efciency of foreign banks, whereas public ownership is not signicant for
explaining efciency. The econometric two-stage approach and the exclusion of physical capital
from the list of inputs are the paper's major limitations.
We use a similar dataset extended to 2006 and adopt the one-stage approach proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1995) to investigate the cost efciency of Russian banks. Besides avoiding the
limitations of previous studies we contribute to the literature by studying whether the introduction
of generalized deposit insurance had any impact on banks' comparative efciency.
4.3 History and problems of the Russian banking sector
The privatization of Russia's former `spetsbanki'33 was a relatively uncontrolled process
33 In 1987 the Soviet Union turned its monobank system into a kind of two-tier banking system with a embryonal central
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that started before 1990, the ofcial start of the bank privatization process, and was largely
accomplished by the end of 1991, when the Soviet system collapsed. This secessionist
privatization yielded a few large successors (Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Mosbiznesbank,
Promstroibank and SBSAgro) and more than 600 relatively small successors. Most of these
were reluctant to restructure, as mirrored in higher costs, higher loan rates, poorer loan quality
and smaller capital buffers (see Schoors, 2003). Not surprisingly most of the smaller successors
faltered during the period 1995-1998. In the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis, the larger
successors were also swept away, with the notorious exceptions of Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank,
which survived as daughters of the CBR and now control a considerable part of the Russian
banking market.34 At present, the vast majority of Russian banks are not burdened by lingering
Soviet deciencies. Most private banks are de novo banks, as the privatized `spetsbanki' faltered
in the period 1992-1999, and most public banks were created after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, by government bodies such as state enterprises, cities and federal, regional or local
governments (see Tompson, 2004 and Vernikov, 2007). In our sample we include 25 in the latter
category. Still, the banking sector has faced serious problems throughout its history.
Early in transition, banks clearly preferred speculation to lending (Schoors, 2001). Bank
lending to the non-nancial sector shrank year after year as a share of total banking assets,
up to 1999. In 2003, bank loans to the non- nancial sector amounted to just 17.0% of GDP
and nanced as little as 4.8% of xed investment.35 Since then, the situation has improved.
This reluctance to lend seems rational with hindsight. The presence of soft legal constraints
(Perotti, 2002) rendered the enforcement of overdue claims difcult or impossible. Bank lending
bank (Gosbank) and specialized `commercial banks'. The latter were Sberbank (the savings bank), Promstroibank
(industry and construction), Zhilsotsbank (housing and communal nancing), Agroprombank (Agriculture) and
Vneshtorgbank.(foreign trade). These specialized banks are commonly referred to as `spetsbanki'.
34 In its 2005 Annual Report, Sberbank claims to hold 54.2% of total retail deposits, 44.1% of consumer loans,
32.2% of corporate loans, 16.6% of government securities and 26.5% of total Russian banking assets. The share in
ruble-denominated retail deposits is even higher - over 70%.
35 Data from the CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics.
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was further depressed by huge information asymmetries between banks and their prospective
customers, and by a lack of screening and monitoring skills in the banks themselves and the
economy at large. Banks were therefore unable to identify good potential borrowers (Brana,
Maurel and Sgard, 1999), and often preferred not to lend at all. Moreover, the vast number of tiny
banks and the lack of a transparent information system for credit histories may have contributed
to lending restraint (Pyle, 2002).
The largest part of the lending went to connected agents, regardless of the viability of the
lending project, and with only very weak monitoring incentives (Laeven, 2001). Many of the
newly founded private banks were captured by their owners. Such pocket banks operated as
treasuries for a rm or a group of rms rather than independent banks. Note that the government,
too, is to some extent a connected party, because several banks were captured by local, regional, or
national governments. At the start of 2003, federal or regional authorities held majority stakes in
23 banks, the regional authorities held minority stakes in several more banks, and a large number
of state enterprises were part-owners of banks (Tompson, 2004).
The average loan quality was negatively affected by the combined problems of connected
lending, soft legal constraints, information asymmetries and the lack of screening and monitoring
skills. A leaked analysis of Russian banks after the crisis of August 1998 shows that the major
problem for banks was not the devaluation loss or the government default on treasury bills, but
bad loans hidden and accumulated during the preceding period.36 Schoors and Sonin (2005)
explain how the Russian banking system was stuck in a passivity trap, where it is rational for
each individual bank to hide bad loans rather than collecting them. Economic growth after 2000
allowed Russian banks to `grow' out of bad loans, but the problem of loan quality is still a latent
threat to the Russian banking system.
The Russian banking sector has in the past suffered from poor capitalization, especially
36 See 'The newly-wed and the nearly dead', Euromoney, June 1999.
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considering the poor quality of assets and the large exposure to exchange rate risk. This
overexposure was revealed when the devaluation in August 1998 changed the capital of many
Russian banks from positive to negative overnight (Perotti, 2002). The CBR has steadily tightened
capital standards since 1999, and Claeys and Schoors (2007) show that these standards are indeed
enforced. As a result, capital levels have reached more acceptable levels. Still our data reveal that
the average capitalization of the Russian banks is substantially higher than the weighted average
capitalization, implying that capital buffers are lower in the banks that are most important for
systemic stability.
The institutional stability of Russian banks has proven weak, with systemic problems in
1994, 1995, 1998 and 2004. Since 1992, more than 2000 Russian banks have been liquidated or
have vanished. Sometimes this was due to a combination of the above-mentioned factors (poor
capitalization, excessive speculative risk, endemic bad loans, connected lending, etc.), but there
were also several instances of Ponzi schemes, where crooks cheated depositors and ed with their
money. In the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis it became apparent that the soft legal constraints
faced by banks encouraged asset stripping and left creditors to bear the brunt of the cost of
failure (Perotti, 2002). Claeys and Schoors (2007) give an overview of the CBR's relatively weak
prudential supervision and control during the rst decade and show that rule-based enforcement
of bank standards is difcult for the CBR because of conicts with systemic stability concerns.
Depositors reacted to this widespread institutional instability by either disciplining their banks in
a sophisticated way37 (Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2006) or eeing to the safe heavens of Sberbank
and Vneshtorgbank that  like all public banks  were covered by an implicit state guarantee38
37 By interpreting very high promised deposit rates as a proxy for institutional instability.
38 Sberbank has a huge branch network and carries a government guarantee. The government lent credibility to this
guarantee by supporting Sberbank when needed and using it as a device to absorb deposits from large defunct deposit
banks in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. The same holds for Vneshtorgbank, as demonstrated in the mini-crisis in
MayJuly 2004, when Vneshtorgbank acquired Gutabank, one of the larger deposit banks under attack. As a result,
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank continue to dominate a highly concentrated deposit market.
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(see OECD, 2004). Figure F.1 shows how Sberbank's share of private deposits39 reached a peak of
close to 80% in 1998.
The government wanted to restore some competition in the deposit market and reacted by
providing a form of partial deposit insurance. The federal law on deposit insurance was introduced
in 2003, but the system only became operational in September 2004.40 Sberbank was initially
exempted and kept its full state guarantee until 1 January 2007, when it nally became subject to
the new deposit insurance scheme. Other regulatory advantages of Sberbank (for example lower
required reserves on ruble deposits) were also abolished. This gradually more level playing eld
ensured that Sberbank's share of private deposits gradually fell during the last ve years to the
still-very-high level of about 50% in 2006 (see gure F.1).
In table E.1 we summarize some of the crucial indicators of recent developments in the Russian
banking system. By early 2006 there were 1253 banks, among which only 1045 money deposit
banks (covered by the deposit insurance scheme) with 3295 bank branches. More than 30% of
these bank branches were however still operated by Sberbank, such that the average bank had
about two branches. Clearly the average Russian bank is tiny by European or world standards.
By 2006 the Russian market included 62 majority foreign-owned banks, but their branch network
was still relatively underdeveloped. On the other hand banking has clearly revived during the
last ve years, with bank lending rising from 17% of GDP in 2001 to 32% in 2006 and private
deposits rising from 8% of GDP to 14% over the same period. Average interest rates seem still
high in nominal terms but are low once ination is taken into account. Clearly Russian banks are
increasingly playing their role as effective intermediaries between saving and investment, but the
banking system still suffers from the predominance of tiny banks with underdeveloped branch
networks, excessive concentration, and a lack of foreign competition. Although private deposit
39 Both ruble- and foreign currency-denominated private deposits.
40 Although an unrelated and opaque form of state guarantee was already granted to all banks in July 2004, to stop the
unfolding banking panic.
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collection is growing, it remains far behind corporate lending.
4.4 Data and variables
The quarterly bank balances and prot and loss accounts were made available to the authors
by the nancial information agency Interfax.41 The chosen sample periods (2002 and 2006) are
convenient to properly detect longitudinal effects of private ownership. Brown et al (2006) nd
that positive effects of domestic privatization appear immediately in Hungary, Romania, and
Ukraine, but emerge only ve years after privatization in Russia. In our study almost all remaining
banks are de novo banks and the few remaining privatized banks are considered 10 years or more
after privatization, so any positive efciency effects are expected to have appeared by then.
The panel is unbalanced because some banks fail, some merge, and some are founded during
the sample period. If a bank merged or was acquired, we treat the resulting larger bank as new.
To identify foreign banks, we use the quarterly lists of 100% foreign-owned banks provided by
the CBR since 1999. The lists of banks with the state as a majority owner are available at two
points in time, February 1, 2002 (Matovnikov, 2002) and July 1, 2005 (Mamontov, 2005). These
lists reveal that the state ownership category remains stable over our sample period.
We do estimations for the periods before (2002) and after (2006) the introduction of deposit
insurance in 2004. For each sub-period, we use a balanced panel which is more convenient for
application of the Battese-Coelli (1995) model. As efciency scores are relative measures of
performance, we need to have comparable banks in terms of activities. We therefore keep only
banks with more-than 10% shares of deposits and loans in total assets. Our nal sample consists
of 747 banks (including 19 public banks and 26 foreign banks) for 2002 and 471 banks (including
15 public banks and 20 foreign banks) for 2006.
The literature disagrees on the role of deposits in banks' production process. The classical
41 Karas and Schoors (2005) provide a detailed description of the dataset and conrm its consistency with other data
sources.
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production approach treats deposits and loans as outputs, and labor and physical capital as
inputs. The intermediation approach rst used by Sealey and Lindley (1977) views banks as
intermediaries between saving and investment in the economy, and treats earning assets as outputs
and deposits as inputs.
The weak development of nancial markets makes a clear focus on the lending and deposit
activities of banks relevant for Russia. Therefore we tend to prefer the production approach in
this paper. The intermediation approach has the disadvantage that deposits are neglected as an
important output. But there is also an argument in favor of the intermediation approach. Public
and foreign banks might have access to cheaper funding if depositors believe those banks to
possess additional protection compared to private domestic banks. Public banks have enjoyed the
explicit state guarantee backing their retail deposits, which was scrapped only at the end of 2003.
In addition, their cost of funds is reduced by the perception that the state will stand behind them
(Tompson, 2004). Foreign banks' deposits may also enjoy an implicit (by the mother bank) or an
explicit deposit guarantee (in some countries, clients of foreign branches of domestic banks are
covered by the national deposit insurance scheme). Such guarantees  perceived or real  could
affect input prices for deposits, but this is not considered in the production approach, where the
cost of deposits is not included in the total cost. This provides a rationale for the intermediation
approach, which considers deposits as an input rather than an output and includes the cost of
deposits in the measure of total costs. In robustness checks, we substitute the intermediation for
the production approach. Our results are however robust to the choice of the production process.
This is not unexpected, given the nding of Wheelock and Wilson (1995) and Berger et al. (1997)
that the choice of approach may have a considerable impact on the level of efciency scores but
not on their rankings.
For the production approach, the output variables are total deposits and total loans. The input
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prices are the price of physical capital, measured by the ratio of other operating expenses to xed
assets, and the price of labor, measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets42, as data
on the number of employees is not available (Altunbas et al. 2000, Weill, 2003). As observed
by Maudos et al. (2002), the latter ratio can be interpreted as labor cost per worker (personnel
expenses to number of employees) adjusted for differences in labor productivity (number of
employees to total assets), since it is the product of these ratios. Total costs are the sum of
personnel expenses and other operating expenses. Controls for environment, risk preferences
and activities mix include seven geographical district dummies, the log of total assets, the log of
equity, the share of bad loans in total loans, and the percentage breakdown of banks' total deposits
and loans by counterpart (households, rms, government, banks).
For the intermediation approach, the output variables are total loans and total securities, while
input prices are the deposit rate (measured as the ratio of interest paid on deposits to interest
bearing deposits), the price of physical capital (dened above), and the price of labor (dened
above). Total costs are the sum of interest paid on deposits, personnel expenses and other
operating expenses.
Table E.2 compares the means of key variables of private and public banks. Table E.3 does the
same for domestic and foreign banks. Both public and foreign banks are much bigger, slightly
less capitalized and more frequently located in the Moscow area, relative to their counterparts,
respectively, private and domestic banks. These patterns are more pronounced in the second
sub-period. Compared to private banks, public banks grant relatively more loans to companies and
banks and relatively less loans to households. Not surprisingly, public banks rely relatively more
on the government as a source of funding. Foreign banks are extremely active on the interbank
market, in terms of both borrowing and lending, while domestic banks are predominantly occupied
42 We use the Tukey box-plot to detect outliers: for each input price, we drop observations lying beyond the range
dened by the rst and third quartile minus/plus two times the interquartile range.
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with core activities: granting loans to companies and individuals, and collecting core deposits.
For all bank categories, household deposits have over time become a much more important source
of funding.
4.5 Methodology
This section develops the methodology used to estimate cost efciency of Russian banks.
Cost efciency refers to how close a bank's cost is to what an optimal bank's cost would be for
producing the same bundle of outputs. It also concerns waste in the production process and the
optimality of the chosen mix of inputs.
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to measure efciency with frontier
approaches. While nonparametric approaches (e.g. DEA) use linear programming techniques,
parametric approaches, such as the stochastic frontier approach, apply econometric tools to
estimate the efciency frontier. We adopt the stochastic frontier approach in our study, following
many studies on banking efciency in transition countries (Weill, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a;
Fries and Taci, 2005). In comparison to DEA, this approach has the advantage of disentangling
inefciency from statistical noise, taking exogenous events into account in the residual (distance
from the efciency frontier). In section 4.7 we also present DEA estimates as additional robustness
checks.
The stochastic frontier approach assumes that total cost deviates from optimal cost by a random
disturbance, v, and an inefciency term, u. Thus the cost function is TC = f(Y; P )+ " where TC
represents total cost, Y is the vector of outputs, P the vector of input prices and " the error term
which is the sum of u and v. u is a one-sided component representing cost inefciencies, meaning
the degree of weakness of managerial performance. v is a two-sided component representing
random disturbances, reecting luck or measurement errors. u and v are independently distributed,
with u assumed to have a truncated normal distribution and v to have a normal distribution. v2
and u2 are the respective variances of v and u. According to Jondrow et al. (1982), rm-specic
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estimates of inefciency terms can be calculated by using the distribution of the inefciency term
conditional on the estimate of the composite error term.
The more straightforward procedure is the so-called two-stage procedure: in the rst stage
the stochastic frontier model is estimated, and in the second stage the efciency scores obtained
are regressed on a set of explanatory variables including ownership variables. Although often
applied in the literature, this two-stage procedure presents two important econometric problems, as
noted by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). First, it assumes that the efciency terms are identically
distributed in the estimation of the stochastic frontier model of the rst stage, while in the second
stage this assumption is contradicted by the fact that the regression of the efciency terms on the
explanatory variables suggests that the efciency terms are not identically distributed. Second, the
explanatory variables must be assumed to be uncorrelated with the variables of the cost frontier
function, or else the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the cost frontier function
would be biased because of the omission of the explanatory variables in the rst stage. But then,
the estimated efciency terms that are explained in the second stage are biased estimates, as they
are estimated relative to a biased representation of the cost frontier.
Therefore, we chose the one-stage procedure proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), which
solves these econometric problems. They propose a procedure for panel data, in which the
non-negative inefciency term is assumed to have a truncated distribution with different means
for each rm. As a result, the distributions of the inefciency terms are not the same, but are
expressed as functions of explanatory variables. The inefciency terms are then independently but
not identically distributed. They are obtained by truncation at zero of the N(it; u2) distribution:
it = zit , where zit is a vector of explanatory variables, and  is a vector of parameters to be
estimated.
The estimated model consists of the cost frontier function and an equation explaining
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inefciency. As is common in the literature on bank efciency in transition countries (Weill, 2003,
Bonin et al., 2005a, Fries and Taci, 2005), we use a standard translog specication of the cost
frontier:
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where TC is total cost, ym mth bank output (m = 1; 2), pl the price of labor, pk the price
of physical capital, and " the composite error term. Inefciency is a function of bank-specic
variables:
uit = zit +Wit (4.2)
where uit is the inefciency, zit is a p  1 vector of explanatory variables,  is a 1  p vector
of parameters to be estimated, Wit is a random variable dened by the truncation of the normal
distribution with mean zero, and 2 = 2u + 2v is the variance.
4.6 Results
We estimate the efciency model for the period before generalized deposit insurance (2002)
and after generalized deposit insurance (2006) to see whether the implementation of deposit
insurance has modied the differences in efciency between banks with different types of
ownership. In all estimations, we include bank ownership variables in the equation explaining
inefciency. Two alternative denitions of public ownership are employed. On the one hand,
we include a dummy variable taking the value of one if the bank is publicly-owned. On the
other hand, following Styrin (2005), we measure public ownership by the ratio of interest income
received from the government to total interest income. Foreign ownership is taken into account
through a dummy variable equaling one if the bank is foreign-owned.
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Table E.4 presents the main results. Panel A gives the results for public banks dened according
to ownership; panel B for public banks dened according to their activities. In the interpretation,
one must keep in mind that the econometric model identies inefciency. Therefore a minus
sign indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable implies lower inefciency, i.e. higher
efciency.
The baseline specication (a) of panel A shows that foreign banks are more efcient than
domestic private banks and public banks, and that public banks are more efcient than domestic
private banks after the introduction of deposit insurance. Indeed, while the estimates for public
ownership are negative and insignicant in specication (a), specication (d) indicates that the
efciency gap between public banks and domestic private banks becomes signicant after the
introduction of generalized deposit insurance. In an economic sense, the efciency differences
are considerable. This is also true in panel B where public banks are identied according to their
activities rather than their ownership.
In the baseline specications (a) and (d), we implicitly assume that the bank's environment
(determined by its location) and risk preferences are management choices. One could however
argue that environment is exogenous to management decisions. Consequently, the inuence of
environment should be disentangled, to get a satisfactory measure of bank efciency. In this
strand of literature, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) have notably shown that environment can
explain cross-country differences in bank efciency. Furthermore, Hugues and Mester (1993)
and Mester (1996) have shown that efciency differences may also derive from differences in
managers' risk preferences. Indeed the degree of risk aversion has an impact on cost efciency.
Risk-loving managers may keep the capital down to its cost-minimizing level (the regulatory
threshold), while risk-averse managers may prefer to hold higher levels of capital. Consequently,
by omitting the level of equity from the cost frontier, we may consider a bank inefcient although
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it behaves optimally given the risk preferences of its managers. Berger and Mester (1997) provide
an additional reason to include the level of equity in the estimation of the cost efciency model,
based on the fact that the bank's insolvency risk depends on the equity available to absorb losses.
This insolvency risk may lead to higher bank costs.43 This issue takes on particular importance in
transition economies like Russia where the insolvency risk of banks is not negligible.
In specications (b) before generalized deposit insurance and (e) after generalized deposit
insurance, we therefore include some environmental variables in the cost frontier. We use
information on the district of the bank, taking into consideration the geographical breakdown of
Russia into 7 districts. We therefore include in the cost frontier 6 dummy variables, equaling
one if the bank is located in the concerned district. In specications (c) and (f), we include the
logarithm of equity in the estimation of the cost frontier to control for risk preferences, in addition
to environmental variables, following notably Mester (1996), Altunbas et al. (2000) and Weill
(2003). All these specications show that the baseline results are very robust. Foreign banks are
consistently the most efcient ones, and public banks are consistently more efcient than domestic
private banks.
This rst set of results suggests that in Russia public banks are more rather than less efcient
than domestic private banks. This is in accordance with Styrin (2005) but differs from Fries and
Taci (2005). Note however that the latter study obtained results on a cross-country sample from
15 transition countries including only a very limited sample of Russian banks. In addition, our
results surprisingly suggest that this efciency advantage was enhanced rather than reduced by the
implementation of the deposit insurance scheme.
Since the results in table E.4 do not take into account the possible effect of systematic
differences in the deposit rate , table E.5 repeats the regressions of table E.4, applying the
43 In our framework, higher solvency risk could affect the costs included in the cost function through higher labor costs
and higher costs of physical capital (to convince depositors to make their deposits, banks with lower capital need to
invest more in their branch networks).
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intermediation approach instead of the production approach. In the intermediation approach the
deposit rate44 is an input cost in the cost function and the total deposit cost is included in the
measure of total cost.
The estimates in table E.5 indicate that our unexpected results are very robust to the choice of
a production process. Applying the intermediation approach, we again nd that foreign banks
exhibit superior efciency, that public banks tend to be more efcient than domestic private banks,
and that the latter efciency gap becomes statistically signicant after the introduction of deposit
insurance. It is suggested therefore that the superior efciency of public over private banks is not
an inheritance of some communist past, but a fact of contemporaneous Russian banking markets.
One explanation for this puzzle could be that public and private banks have different sets of
activities and that the typical activity mix of public banks involves fewer costs than that which is
typical of private banks. In tables E.6 through E.9, we test this idea by including measures of the
activity mix in the equation explaining inefciency.
We consider the activity mix in the form of lending and deposit shares by type of customer
(households, rms, government, banks) and the average loan quality (measured as the ratio of
classied loans to total loans).45 In tables E.6 and E.7 we apply the production approach, in tables
E.8 and E.9 the intermediation approach. Tables E.6 and E.8 identify public banks by ownership,
while tables E.7 and E.9 identify public banks by revealed activities involving the government.
In each table we have 4 specications. In specication (a) we include the regional dummies in
the estimation of the efcient frontier and all the activity mix variables in the equation explaining
inefciency. In specication (b) we additionally include equity in the estimation of the efcient
frontier. In specication (c) we include the regional dummies and the activity mix variables in
the estimation of the efcient frontier, leaving only loan quality as an explanatory variable for
44 Public banks could have systematically lower deposit rates than private banks.
45 Since the bank share and the government share are zero for many banks, their sum is the omitted variable for both
lending and deposits. The results do not change if instead households or rms are the excluded category.
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the residual inefciency. In specication (d) we include the regional dummies, equity and the set
of activity mix variables in the estimation of the frontier, again leaving only loan quality as an
explanatory variable for residual inefciency. Our three main results are highly robust in all these
exercises. Foreign banks are again more efcient than domestic private banks. Public banks tend
to be more efcient than domestic private ones. This effect seems to be stronger after than before
the introduction of deposit insurance. Moreover, the results are stronger rather than weaker in
some cases. In table E.6, for example (production approach, public ownership), the public banks'
superior efciency becomes statistically evident even for the pre-deposit-insurance period. In
table E.8 (intermediation approach, public ownership), the public banks become less inefcient
than even the foreign banks in the pre-deposit-insurance period.
4.7 Further robustness checks
The summary statistics in table E.2 indicate that public banks are on average very large
compared to domestic private banks. If scale economies are present in the Russian banking sector,
these considerable size differences may explain our results. Note however that one could also
hypothesize that large Russian private banks are less efcient than their smaller competitors.
Claeys and Schoors (2007) nd that large Russian banks enjoy regulatory forbearance from the
part of the Central Bank of Russia. Having such soft legal constraints means that managers of
larger banks are subject to less regulatory pressure. This gives the managers greater freedom to
maximize the private benets of control, which may come at the cost of lower efciency. To
control for the size effect we repeat our estimations for a size-matched sample. The matching
procedure for the two sub-periods is as follows:
1. We exclude the largest public banks, Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and Gazprombank from
the two samples. They dominate the market and their special status (see above) may drive the
results.
2. For each of the remaining public banks, we identify in each time period 20 size-matched
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(size in terms of total assets) private domestic banks. Specically, we select the closest 10 larger
and the closest 10 smaller private domestic banks that have not been selected yet for the given
period. This yields two lists of matching banks, one for the sample before deposit insurance and
one for the sample after deposit insurance.
3. Finally, we balance the sample by dropping all banks that fail to show up in all 4
quarters of the sub-period.
This procedure yields 123 matching private domestic banks before deposit insurance (492
bank observations) and 141 matching private domestic banks after deposit insurance (564 bank
observations). All foreign banks are retained in the sample. In table E.12 we present summary
statistics for this matched sample. One observes that the size differences are now substantially
smaller than in the full sample of table E.2.
In table E.10, we repeat the estimations with all possible controls of table E.6. In tables
E.13 through E.15 we show the reproduced estimations with the size-matched datasets from
the remaining tables E.7 through E.9. Our three main ndings are robust, but the estimated
efciency gap becomes smaller in most specications. The public bank variable remains negative
in all specications of all panels, although its signicance falters in some specications of the
intermediation approach (see tables E.14 and E.15). Apparently the observed efciency gap
between public and private banks is not only driven by size differences or by the special position
enjoyed by CBR-owned large public banks, but also by some genuine efciency differences.
As a further robustness check we employed a two-stage DEA procedure. In the rst stage we
estimate time-specic bank efciency scores for each quarter. We use the quarterly efciency
scores for each bank to compute its mean efciency scores for each year (2002 before the reform,
2006 after the reform). In a second stage, we regress these mean efciency scores on a set of
determinants (public ownership, foreign ownership, activity) using a Tobit estimator. This exercise
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was performed on both the full and size-matched samples. Results for the second stage Tobit
regressions are presented in table E.11. Note that DEA is a totally different estimation strategy,
often leading to quite different results. The interpretation of the signs is now different, since DEA
measures efciency rather than inefciency and since the estimates are time-specic rather than
panel estimates.
From table E.11 we observe that foreign banks are again found to be more efcient than
domestic banks. The efciency of publicly owned banks is never signicantly different from that
of private banks. The introduction of deposit insurance again seems to affect efciency differences
in favor of foreign banks and public banks. In the case of publicly owned banks, the signs of the
estimates change from insignicantly negative in 2002 to insignicantly positive in 2006.
4.8 Concluding remarks
For the Russian banking market we document three highly robust results with respect to bank
efciency. Foreign banks are more efcient than domestic private banks (no surprise), domestic
private banks are not more efcient than public banks (surprise) and the introduction of deposit
insurance increased any existing efciency gap between public and private banks (big surprise).
These results are not driven by the choice of production process, environment, risk preferences,
activity mix, size, or econometric approach.
This result of foreign banks' superior efciency agrees with most of the related literature on
transition countries. Namely, Weill (2003), Fries and Taci (2005) and Bonin et al. (2005a) come
to similar conclusions based on samples of banks from various transition countries. This nding is
also highly robust in the specications that take account of environment, equity, size and structure
of activities. It may nd its origin in both reasons proposed by Weill (2003). On the one hand,
most shareholders of foreign banks are themselves banks. Consequently, these shareholders can
provide their know-how in organization and risk analysis to their subsidiaries. On the other hand,
foreign banks would benet from better corporate governance as shareholders originating from
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Western economies would be more accustomed to monitoring bank managers.
But why are private banks not more efcient than public banks in Russia? This unexpected
nding is neither in accordance with the general prior that public ownership is less efcient than
private ownership, nor with the ndings of Bonin et al. (2005a) and Fries and Taci (2005) for
cross-country samples of banks from Central and Eastern European countries. Implicit state
guarantees may have rendered Russia's public banks' access to deposits less costly in terms of
labor and physical capital, resulting in higher efciency. A greater depositor base may in turn lead
to a greater pool of loan applicants. Therefore, public banks may also benet from granting a
larger amount of loans than private banks for the same level of costs, because they must expend
less effort to nd borrowers. But if this explanation is true, the creation of a more level playing
eld via the introduction of a generalized deposit insurance scheme, no matter how incomplete,
should have mitigated the efciency difference, and yet we obtained the opposite result. So this
explanation must be abandoned. Still deposit insurance may have played a role through moral
hazard. There is strong evidence that Russian private domestic banks were subject to strong and
sophisticated market discipline before the introduction of deposit insurance (see Karas, Schoors
and Pyle, 2006). This forced them to improve their efciency. The introduction of deposit
insurance may however have reduced the pressure from market discipline, without replacing it
with sufciently strong regulatory pressure. In short, the introduction of deposit insurance may
have introduced moral hazard, leading to more, rather than less, inefcient management practices
in private banks.
Alternatively, the observed increase in the efciency gap between public and private banks
may be due to increased switching costs (see Kim et al., 2003). These switching costs notably
derive from costs linked to the time and effort needed to close an account and open it elsewhere,
to become comfortable with unfamiliar procedures and new bank employees, and from costs
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related to the loss of capitalized value of established relationships. Switching costs may also
endogenously result from the fact that banks benet from better information on their clients as
compared to their competitors (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). The widespread trust in public banks
accumulated through their long dominance of the Russian retail markets and the renewed distrust
of private banks after the `mini-crisis' of May-July 2004 (see above) may have increased the costs
of switching from public to private banks. More importantly, the several weeks of turbulence on
the Russian inter-bank market triggered by the CBR's intervention in the case of a bank accused of
money-laundering, reduced depositors' trust in the banking system and led to a ight to quality,
i.e. a shift of deposits from private to public banks.
Given the fact that Russian public banks are not more inefcient than private ones, the
large state presence in the Russian banking sector is not necessarily the cause of its relative
inefciency and the well-known corollaries of lower credit levels and more nancial instability.
The implication is that bank privatization will not necessarily improve the efciency of the
Russian banking system. Since the main inefciency seems to reside with domestic private banks,
the system's efciency may benet more from increased competition than from privatization.
This can be achieved by creating a more level and more stable regulatory playing eld for all
banks, an objective on which the CBR is making progress, and by opening the market to foreign
competition. In this light, the CBR's relentless efforts46 of the last years (2006-2007) to get rid of
inefcient and fraudulent banks regardless of their size and the increasing access of foreign banks
to the Russian banking sector may be more instrumental in boosting the sector's efciency than
yet another round of chaotic privatization.
46 These efforts are deeply resented by some banks that fear losing their license and culminated in the brutal murder in
October 2006 of the Mr. Kozlov, vice president of the CBR in charge of bank licensing policy. The CBR reacted by
reinforcing its effort to sweep though the banking licenses.
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Appendix E Tables
Table E.1: Some Indicators of recent developments in the Russian banking sector
Data as at start of period unless otherwise indicated 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of credit organizations 2126 2003 1828 1668 1518 1409
with banking license 1311 1319 1329 1329 1299 1253
license to attract private deposits 1239 1223 1202 1190 1165 1045
license to conduct foreign currency operations 764 810 839 845 839 827
general license 244 262 293 310 311 301
license for operations with precious metals 163 171 175 181 182 184
Foreign credit organizations with banking license 130 125 126 128 131 136
fully foreign owned 22 23 27 32 33 41
50 to 100% foreign owned 11 12 10 9 9 11
Total number of branches 3793 3433 3326 3219 3238 3295
of which branches of Sberbank 1529 1233 1162 1045 1011 1009
of which branches of fully foreign owned banks 7 9 12 15 16 29
Corporate Lending/GDP (eop) 17% 19% 22% 25% 27% 32%
Private deposits/GDP 8% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14%
Lending/Gross xed capital formation (eop) 92% 105% 120% 137% 149% 177%
Ination (eop) 18.6% 15.1% 12.0% 11.7% 10.9% 9.0%
Deposit rate (period average) 4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1%
Lending rate (period average) 17.9% 15.7% 13.0% 11.4% 10.7% 10.5%
Note: Sources: Rosstat, CBR and International Financial Statistics (IMF). Lending dened as lending of deposit money banks to private and public enterprises,
excluding nancial companies.
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Table E.2: Means of key variables for private and public banks
2002 2006
Private banks Public banks Private banks Public banks
Characteristics
Total assets 1,213.56 17,585.80 2,934.71 160,481.92
Total costs (production) 49.26 593.51 142.65 6,575.91
Total costs (intermediation) 57.90 696.50 168.36 7,941.45
Loans 901.67 12,400.59 2,182.47 118,575.98
Deposits 855.46 9,406.17 2,278.33 127,781.46
Investment assets 73.60 2,283.15 380.68 29,776.67
Price of labor 0.0106 0.0105 0.0102 0.0078
Price of physical capital 1.8113 1.5108 1.8488 2.0085
Price of borrowed funds 0.0111 0.0089 0.0121 0.0110
Equity/total assets 0.2726 0.2348 0.1837 0.1297
Bad loans / loans 0.0184 0.0247 0.0189 0.0114
Loan activities
Household loans / loans 0.0790 0.0232 0.1915 0.1474
Firm loans / loans 0.6649 0.6622 0.6292 0.6654
Government loans / loans 0.0108 0.0104 0.0066 0.0181
Bank loans / loans 0.2453 0.3042 0.1726 0.1691
Deposit activities
Household dep./ deposits 0.2285 0.1267 0.4180 0.3526
Firm deposits / deposits 0.6080 0.5889 0.4796 0.3888
Government dep. /deposits 0.0262 0.1298 0.017 0.1232
Bank dep. / deposits 0.1373 0.1547 0.0908 0.1355
Environment
Moscow area 0.5192 0.5789 0.3706 0.4667
Number of observations 2912 76 1824 60
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Table E.3: Means of key variables for domestic and foreign banks
2002 2006
Domestic banks Foreign banks Domestic banks Foreign banks
Characteristics
Total assets 1,385.31 8,414.93 7,521.01 17,674.06
Total cost (production) 55.35 277.95 332.89 677.80
Total cost (intermediation) 64.70 336.12 398.33 812.46
Loans 998.13 6,629.65 5,559.31 13,329.95
Deposits 860.11 6,975.06 5,902.71 14,675.99
Investment assets 111.20 645.49 1,243.35 2,974.54
Price of labor 0.0107 0.0077 0.0103 0.0073
Price of physical capital 1.7828 2.3836 1.8528 1.8800
Price of borrowed funds 0.0112 0.0088 0.0122 0.0096
Equity/total assets 0.2725 0.2462 0.1827 0.1677
Bad loans / loans 0.0184 0.0216 0.0172 0.0508
Loan activities
Household loans / loans 0.0792 0.0337 0.1904 0.1838
Firm loans / loans 0.6718 0.4709 0.6360 0.5036
Government loans / loans 0.0112 0.0001 0.0073 0.0001
Bank loans / loans 0.2379 0.4954 0.1663 0.3125
Deposit activities
Household dep./ deposits 0.2290 0.1401 0.4277 0.1498
Firm deposits / deposits 0.6150 0.4012 0.4809 0.3811
Government dep. /deposits 0.0299 0.0001 0.0159 0.0001
Bank dep. / deposits 0.1261 0.4585 0.0755 0.4691
Environment
Moscow area 0.5118 0.7692 0.3503 0.9000
Number of observations 2884 104 1804 80
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Table E.6: Robustness to differences in activity mix. Panel A
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -1.041** -1.153*** -0.679** -0.801**
(2.04) (3.06) (2.03) (2.23)
Foreign banks -0.803*** -0.873*** -0.584** -0.653
(2.85) (2.61) (2.06) (1.58)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -2163.004 -2162.106 -2130.126 -2128.461
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -2.699*** -1.739*** -5.397** -2.859***
(3.85) (3.67) (2.47) (3.46)
Foreign banks -4.514*** -3.885*** -7.153* -5.523***
(3.71) (3.64) (1.97) (3.28)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1226;456 -1165.323 -1230.926 -1143.223
Note: Public banks dened as state-owned banks, production approach
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Table E.7: Robustness to differences in activity mix. Panel B
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -1.348 -1.561 -0.862 -1.137
(1.24) (1.58) (0.95) (1.53)
Foreign banks -0.788*** -0.863** -0.574** -0.654*
(2.89) (2.52) (2.05) (1.70)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -2163.432 -2162.537 -2130.490 -2128.775
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -3.329*** -2.766*** -3.602 -2.855***
(3.37) (3.87) (1.18) (3.17)
Foreign banks -4.553*** -4.001*** -5.611 -5.627**
(3.35) (3.63) (1.39) (2.43)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1231.047 -1167.378 -1235.123 -1145.789
Note: Public banks dened as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies, production approach
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Table E.8: Robustness to differences in activity mix. Panel C
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -1.285*** -1.259** -1.471 -1.447*
(2.31) (2.36) (1.58) (1.93)
Foreign banks 0.005 0.018 -1.609 -0.155
(0.02) (0.11) (0.51) (0.81)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1917.841 -1916.956 -1917.810 -1917.737
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -1.957*** -1.857*** -2.244 -2.326***
(2.57) (5.08) (1.60) (3.88)
Foreign banks -3.863*** -4.378*** -3.924** -6.275***
(2.93) (10.40) (2.07) (3.14)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -951.341 -932.902 -998.824 -975.377
Note: Public banks dened as state-owned banks, intermediation approach
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Table E.9: Robustness to differences in activity mix. Panel D
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -0.967 -0.890 -1.320 -1.267
(1.53) (1.47) (1.10) (1.17)
Foreign banks 0.054 0.067 -0.125 -0.118
(0.24) (0.38) (0.53) (0.59)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1919.707 -1918.822 -1919.208 -1919.153
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -2.670** -2.824*** -2.518 -2.978***
(2.28) (3.98) (1.36) (2.81)
Foreign banks -3.892*** -4.359*** -3.847*** -6.380***
(2.77) (3.85) (2.76) (2.76)
Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -953.868 -934.310 -1000.718 -976.560
Note: Public banks dened as banks that receive a high share of interest income from the government bodies, intermediation approach
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Table E.10: Size-matched results. Panel A
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -2.130 -2.153*** -0.226 -0.244
(1.14) (2.73) (0.66) (0.57)
Foreign banks 0.412 0.384 0.039 0.012
(0.64) (1.32) (0.11) (0.04)
Household deposits % 1.594 1.035 - -
(0.71) (1.46)
Firm deposits % 6.439 6.175*** - -
(1.23) (3.26)
Household loans % 2.130 2.681* - -
(1.17) (1.92)
Firm loans % 2.226 2.639** - -
(1.36) (2.23)
Bad loans % 11.841 15.918** 6.168 6.742
(1.47) (2.53) (1.62) (1.22)
Log-likelihood -397.439 -397.026 -390.969 -390.955
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -0.331* -0.190** -1.406** -1.280**
(1.95) (1.96) (2.06) (2.27)
Foreign banks -1.433*** -0.907*** -2.660* -1.987**
(6.74) (11.58) (1.94) (2.36)
Household deposits % -0.815*** 0.030 - -
(3.60) (0.36)
Firm deposits % -0.222 0.154** - -
(1.16) (2.48)
Household loans % 0.718*** 0.293 - -
(2.69) (1.64)
Firm loans % 0.813*** 0.416*** - -
(3.57) (3.69)
Bad loans % 0.018 0.207 -3.215 -4.126
(0.03) (1.08) (0.89) (1.06)
Log-likelihood -360.661 -332.218 -349.916 -339.517
Note: Public banks dened as state-owned banks, production approach
120
Ta
bl
e
E.
11
:R
ob
us
tn
es
st
o
ot
he
re
co
no
m
et
ric
te
ch
ni
qu
es
:D
EA
Pa
ne
lA
:P
ub
lic
ba
nk
sd
e
ne
d
as
sta
te
-o
wn
ed
ba
nk
s,
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
Fr
on
tie
rc
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s
Be
fo
re
ge
ne
ra
lis
ed
de
po
sit
in
su
ra
nc
e
(2
00
2)
Af
te
rg
en
er
al
ise
d
de
po
sit
in
su
ra
nc
e
(2
00
6)
(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
(d
)
(e
)
(f)
In
te
rc
ep
t
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Pu
bl
ic
ba
nk
s
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
23
3
-0
.0
21
0.
01
4
0.
01
3
0.
01
3
(0
.3
2)
(1
.1
6)
(1
.0
7)
(0
.6
8)
(0
.6
3)
(0
.6
1)
Fo
re
ig
n
ba
nk
s
0.
05
5*
**
0.
00
8
0.
00
8
0.
14
5*
**
0.
13
5*
**
0.
13
5*
**
(3
.0
3)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
5)
(8
.0
0)
(6
.6
6)
(6
.6
7)
A
ct
iv
iti
es
-
Ye
s
Ye
s
-
Ye
s
Ye
s
B
ad
lo
an
s
-
-
Ye
s
-
-
Ye
s
Lo
g-
lik
el
ih
oo
d
73
3.
98
3
77
6.
94
5
78
5.
22
9
52
5.
60
3
53
8.
23
8
53
8.
29
6
Pa
ne
lB
:P
ub
lic
ba
nk
sd
e
ne
d
as
sta
te
-o
wn
ed
ba
nk
s,
siz
e-
m
at
ch
ed
sa
m
pl
e
In
te
rc
ep
t
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Pu
bl
ic
ba
nk
s
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
34
-0
.0
33
0.
02
4
0.
01
8
0.
01
7
(0
.6
8)
(1
.0
1)
(1
.0
0)
(0
.7
8)
(0
.6
3)
(0
.6
0)
Fo
re
ig
n
ba
nk
s
0.
05
5*
0.
00
5
0.
00
4
0.
15
2*
**
0.
12
8*
**
0.
11
2*
**
(1
.9
0)
(0
.1
8)
(0
.1
2)
(6
.1
1)
(4
.3
1)
(3
.7
0)
A
ct
iv
iti
es
-
Ye
s
Ye
s
-
Ye
s
Ye
s
B
ad
lo
an
s
-
-
Ye
s
-
-
Ye
s
Lo
g-
lik
el
ih
oo
d
85
.3
42
93
.2
96
94
.7
64
13
0.
48
3
14
7.
45
5
14
9.
41
1
N
ot
e:
'E
nv
iro
nm
en
t'
m
ea
ns
th
at
re
gi
on
al
du
m
m
ie
s
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
tim
at
io
n
of
th
e
co
st
fr
on
tie
r.
'E
qu
ity
'
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
in
cl
us
io
n
of
th
e
ba
nk
's
eq
ui
ty
in
th
e
es
tim
at
io
n
of
th
e
co
st
fr
on
tie
r.
N
=7
47
fo
r
th
e
r
st
pe
rio
d,
N
=4
71
fo
r
th
e
se
co
nd
pe
rio
d.
A
bs
ol
ut
e
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
*,
**
,*
**
de
no
te
an
es
tim
at
e
si
gn
i
ca
nt
ly
di
ffe
re
nt
fr
om
ze
ro
at
th
e
10
,5
an
d
1
pe
rc
en
t
121
Table E.12: Means of key variables for private and public banks, size-matched sample
2002 2006
Private banks Public banks Private banks Public banks
Characteristics
Total assets 5,151.91 7,401.68 8,121.43 32,322.32
Total costs (production) 203.89 281.03 388.71 1,108.36
Total costs (intermediation) 240.25 339.56 459.19 1,352.25
Loans 3,911.10 4,898.84 6,058.27 23,751.46
Deposits 3,763.33 5,315.51 6,332.80 25,765.57
Investment assets 325.33 915.25 1,143.52 5,345.11
Price of labor 0.0083 0.0112 0.0087 0.0087
Price of physical capital 2.4495 1.2885 2.1035 1.5660
Price of borrowed funds 0.0105 0.0086 0.0125 0.0111
Equity/total assets 0.2149 0.2313 0.1448 0.1341
Bad loans / loans 0.0207 0.0229 0.0203 0.0107
Loan activities
Household loans / loans 0.0495 0.0248 0.1632 0.1591
Firm loans / loans 0.6163 0.6586 0.6431 0.6606
Government loans / loans 0.0099 0.0111 0.0074 0.0189
Bank loans / loans 0.3243 0.3055 0.1862 0.1614
Deposit activities
Household dep./ deposits 0.1977 0.1204 0.3755 0.3561
Firm deposits / deposits 0.5180 0.5858 0.4606 0.3872
Government dep. /deposits 0.0359 0.1438 0.0186 0.1452
Bank dep. / deposits 0.2484 0.1501 0.1454 0.1115
Environment
Moscow area 0.6016 0.5882 0.5106 0.4167
Number of observations 492 68 564 48
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Table E.13: Further size-matched results. Panel B
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -2.934 -3.236** -0.993 -0.994
(1.40) (2.03) (0.43) (0.45)
Foreign banks 0.655 1.050 0.065 0.045
(1.01) (1.62) (0.26) (0.12)
Household deposits % 2.451 3.363** - -
(1.28) (1.97)
Firm deposits % 7.025* 7.719*** - -
(1.80) (2.62)
Household loans % 2.563 3.115** - -
(1.47) (2.19)
Firm loans % 2.356* 2.064 - -
(1.83) (2.43)
Bad loans % 13.430*** 7.458 6.477 6.806
(2.14) (4.39) (1.50) (1.15)
Log-likelihood -399.040 -397.810 -390.961 -390.958
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -0.386 -0.232 -3.680* -2.779*
(0.93) (0.93) (1.91) (1.70)
Foreign banks -1.221*** -0.940*** -1.943** -1.490**
(6.42) (18.57) (2.41) (2.27)
Household deposits % -0.586** -0.036 - -
(2.23) (0.95)
Firm deposits % -0.049 0.107*** - -
(0.27) (2.72)
Household loans % 0.718*** 0.665*** - -
(2.81) (4.11)
Firm loans % 0.808*** 0.329*** - -
(3.72) (5.13)
Bad loans % -0.251 0.881*** -4.794 -5.458
(0.24) (4.89) (0.93) (0.77)
Log-likelihood -365.493 -320.609 -350.452 -340.378
Note: Public banks dened as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies, production approach
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Table E.14: Further size-matched results. Panel C
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -2.431 -3.593 -5.097 -5.466**
(1.36) (1.19) (0.60) (2.06)
Foreign banks -0.008 0.158 0.503 1.609*
(0.02) (0.51) (0.33) (1.65)
Household deposits % -0.407 0.126 - -
(0.36) (0.07)
Firm deposits % 0.045* 6.680 - -
(1.76) (1.48)
Household loans % -1.657 -2.028 - -
(0.74) (1.58)
Firm loans % 0.527 0.241 - -
(0.93) (0.32)
Bad loans % 9.552** 7.142 17.085 -0.539
(2.10) (1.56) (0.79) (0.14)
Log-likelihood -327.203 -326.982 -333.275 -331.822
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -1.304 -1.393* -1.478 -1.619
(1.62) (1.87) (0.68) (1.20)
Foreign banks -2.031** -2.080* -2.760 -2.668
(2.03) (1.85) (0.82) (1.25)
Household deposits % -4.213** -4.195** - -
(2.34) (2.11)
Firm deposits % 0.181 0.255 - -
(0.35) (0.69)
Household loans % 1.548** 1.606* - -
(1.99) (1.94)
Firm loans % 1.538* 1.450** - -
(1.91) (2.19)
Bad loans % 0.404 0.242 -4.044 -4.117
(0.15) (0.15) (0.63) (0.90)
Log-likelihood -220.328 -218.397 -205.273 -200.991
Note: Public banks dened as state-owned banks, intermediation approach
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Table E.15: Further size-matched results. Panel D
Pre-generalized deposit insurance (2002)
Frontier characteristics (a) (b) (c) (d)
environment equity environment equity
and environment and activities and environment
and activities
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -3.323 -4.430 -13.875 -13.125***
(1.34) (0.66) (1.21) (2.57)
Foreign banks 0.127 0.353 0.685 1.840*
(0.42) (0.35) (1.06) (1.93)
Household deposits % 0.276 0.846 - -
(0.23) (0.29)
Firm deposits % 4.403* 6.259 - -
(1.72) (0.67)
Household loans % -1.394 -1.884 - -
(0.85) (0.55)
Firm loans % 0.422 0.212 - -
(1.09) (0.30)
Bad loans % 9.870** 8.760 15.098 1.318
(2.02) (1.09) (1.54) (0.53)
Log-likelihood -331.408 -331.208 -334.246 -332.787
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public banks -1.464 -1.382 -2.555 -1.690
(0.93) (0.98) (0.54) (1.28)
Foreign banks -1.775* -1.832* -2.449 -2.392
(1.91) (1.68) (0.80) (1.52)
Household deposits % -3.826** -3.849** - -
(2.39) (2.26)
Firm deposits % 0.674 0.791 - -
(1.50) (1.37)
Household loans % 1.539* 1.622* - -
(1.90) (1.94)
Firm loans % 1.686** 1.634** - -
(2.41) (2.06)
Bad loans % 0.191 0.033 -4.504 -4.400
(0.09) (0.01) (0.48) (1.21)
Log-likelihood -223.653 -222.113 -205.615 -201.543
Note: Public banks dened as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies, intermediation approach
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Appendix F Figures
Figure F.1: Sberbank's dominance in personal deposit market
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Chapter 5 Liquidity Matters: Evidence from Interbank Market
5.1 Introduction
There is an apparent puzzle at the heart of the 2007-2008 credit crisis. The 2007 estimates of
the likely total losses on subprime mortgages were roughly equivalent to a single day's movement
in the U.S. stock market (Adrian and Shin, 2008).47 The resulting conventional wisdom in
policy circles up to the summer of 2007 was that the subprime exposure was too small to lead
to widespread problems in the nancial system. Yet, reality proved different. The credit crisis
developed with a ferocity that led some observers to characterize it as one of the worst nancial
shocks that the United States has confronted since the Great Depression (Mishkin, 2008).
The presumption that subprime exposures did not pose a serious threat to the nancial system
could be justied by the "domino" model of nancial contagion. This model works through direct
credit losses depleting bank capital: Bank A, for whatever reason, defaults on a payment to Bank
B that produces a loss greater than B's capital and forces it to default on payment to Bank C with
losses that are larger than C's capital, and so on down the chain (see Allen and Gale (2000) for a
theoretical model).
The "domino" model of contagion seems, however, to be a poor description of reality. The
crucial variable in this model is capital, measuring banks' ability to absorb losses and prevent the
propagation of the shock. According to Adrian and Shin (2008) the capital of nancial institutions
was large enough to absorb subprime losses without difculty, yet this hardly stopped contagion
from spreading through the nancial system. Furthermore, simulation studies by several central
banks relying on the "domino" model uncovered limited risk of a systemic meltdown (see Sheldon
and Maurer (1998) for Switzerland, Furne (2003) for the U.S., Upper and Worms (2004) for
47 Upwards revised estimates reported in Greenlaw et. al. (2008) still remain small in relative terms.
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Germany, Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for the Netherlands, and Degryse and Nguyen (2007)
for Belgium). These estimates of limited systemic risk contrast sharply with the broad nancial
disruption experienced in 2007-2008.
One potential reason for the seeming empirical irrelevance of the "domino" model of contagion
is its focus on just one propagation mechanism - through direct interbank linkages. De Bandt and
Hartmann (2000) identify another fundamental channel of contagion in banking markets which
relies on more indirect interconnections. This second, "information", channel relates to contagious
withdrawals (runs) when depositors are imperfectly informed about the type of shocks hitting
banks (idiosyncratic or systemic) and about their physical exposures to each other (asymmetric
information). Rochet and Vives (2004) model a "modern" form of such bank runs where large
well-informed investors refuse to renew their credit on the interbank market. An adverse shock to
one bank may create uncertainty about other banks that may be subject to the same shock. Since
interbank market participants are generally risk averse and have asymmetric information about
each other's nancial health, banks may overreact to any negative news and withdraw their funds
as quickly as possible. Such a generalized liquidity crunch may push a solvent institution into
illiquidity and bankruptcy.
In this paper we supplement the traditional "domino" model of contagion, henceforth referred
to as "capital" channel, with the "information", or "liquidity", channel, and apply it to the Russian
interbank market. We undertake a stylized exercise - resembling a stress test - in which we
simulate the consequences of non-repayment of interbank loans of an individual bank on the
solvency and liquidity of its bank lenders. Lenders rendered by the encountered credit loss either
insolvent or illiquid default on their own obligations and, thus, lead to further rounds of losses
and failures. Exploiting monthly data on bilateral interbank exposures we quantify the potential
damage such contagion effects could produce for the Russian banking system in 1998-2004.
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In line with previous studies our simulations reveal limited potential for contagion through
the direct capital channel. The capital channel partially captures the 1998 interbank crisis, but
completely misses the 2004 interbank meltdown. In contrast, we document substantial potential
for contagion through indirect liquidity channel. The liquidity channel not only captures the 1998
crisis but also the 2004 crisis very accurately. The results are robust to the denition of the initial
shock (either the failure of a single bank or the correlated default of a number of banks).
Next to correctly identifying periods of intrinsic instability on a system level, our simulations
produce bank-specic failure frequencies that possess predictive power for real bank defaults
beyond that contained in bank fundamentals. More importantly, our approach reveals that the
Central Bank of Russia's (CBR) liquidity injections were effective in stabilizing the interbank
market, lending support to the thesis that LOLR interventions can correct coordination failures on
the interbank market.
5.2 Russian Interbank Market
Two established and highly respected private nancial information agencies Banksrate.ru
and Mobile provided us with monthly bank balances and monthly reports "On Interbank Loans
and Deposits (ofcial form's code 0409501) for the period August 1998 - November 2004.48
The latter report provides information on banks' gross interbank positions split by counterparty
enabling us to reconstruct the exact matrix of interbank exposures at the beginning of each month.
Balance sheets of foreign banks and off-balance-sheet positions are not available.
Our simulations distinguish between two types of shocks, idiosyncratic and systemic, and two
types of risk, solvency risk and liquidity risk. Such distinctions capture the differences between
the two crises that hit the Russian banking sector in August 1998 and summer 2004, both resulting
in the collapse of the interbank market. While the 2004 crisis was mainly triggered by rumors
48 For more information on the data providers see their respective websites at www.banks-rate.ru and www.mobile.ru.
Karas and Schoors (2005) provide a detailed description of Mobile database.
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Figure 5.1: Liquidity Drains on the Russian Interbank Market
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associated with a single bank failure, the 1998 turmoil resulted from a fundamental systemic
shock having direct effects on banks' solvency. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the periods of low
interbank market activity that followed both shocks together with a lesser-scale liquidity drain in
the end of 2003. In all 3 cases, the volume of interbank lending decreases by less than the number
of outstanding contracts consistent with the idea that in times of distrust big banks decrease their
lending to each other by less than their lending to smaller banks.
The roots of the 1998 crisis go back to 1996 when the government's desperate need for money
in the run-up to the presidential elections led to very high yields on treasury bills (GKOs).
In the beginning of 1996 the average lending rate on loans to the real economy was 60% per
annum, while the yield on GKOs was around 100% per annum. Moreover, incomes from GKO
investment were tax deductible. In the second half of 1996 Russian banks began borrowing
actively on foreign markets (currency loans from foreign banks and Eurobonds). The huge
difference between domestic and foreign interest rates in combination with relatively stable rouble
exchange rate, guaranteed by the ruble corridor policy (a crawling currency band), ensured huge
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prots. When the GKO market was opened to foreigners in 1997, the desire of foreign investors
to hedge their ruble investments was met by Russian counterparties, who took short positions in
forward contracts on foreign currency. The Russian banks, involved in this trade, carried a huge
amount of fundamentally uncovered currency risk. In the beginning of 1998 the share of foreign
currency denominated liabilities signicantly exceeded rouble denominated liabilities. In a vain
attempt to reduce the currency mismatch in their books, banks began extending foreign currency
denominated loans to domestic borrowers. In fact, by shifting currency risk to their borrowers,
banks substituted it by credit risk, because after the rouble devaluation most of the borrowers
defaulted.
The Asian crisis and dwindling yields on GKOs made Russian government debt securities less
attractive to foreigners and provoked capital outow. Protecting the rouble from devaluation, the
CBR lost a large share of its international reserves. At the same time the Russian government
faced problems to roll over its GKO debt. In August 1998 the CBR's exchange rate policy became
untenable. Although GKO yields soared to 100% per annum and more, banks were liquidating
their positions. On 17 August 1998, Russia abandoned its exchange rate regime, defaulted on
its domestic public debt and declared a moratorium on all private foreign liabilities, which was
equivalent to an outright default. The Russian bank sector was hit severely by the uncovered
forward contracts on foreign currency, the government default on GKOs and the subsequent bank
runs (Perotti, 2002). The crisis completely paralyzed the interbank market. The recovery took
more than one year.
The 'mini-crisis' of 2004 was sparkled by unexpected regulatory action. In May 2004 the CBR
closed a bank accused of money laundering while the head of the Federal Service for Financial
Monitoring (FSFM) Mr. Zubkov announced that his Service suspected about a dozen banks
in money laundering and sponsorship of terrorism, without naming the 'dirty dozen'. Several
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Figure 5.2: Financial Crises and Banks' Health
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inconsistent `black lists' began circulating the banking community as bankers tried to guess
which banks were suspected by the FSFM. Mutual suspicion led to a drying up of liquidity on
the interbank market, putting pressure on the hundreds of smaller banks that are highly dependent
on it. The crisis of condence provoked runs on several large banks among which were Guta
Bank and Alfa Bank. Being severely hit by the liquidity shock and abrupt withdrawal of a number
of large depositors, Guta Bank found itself on the edge of bankruptcy and was acquired by the
state-owned Vneshtorgbank at a symbolic price.
Figure 5.2 conrms that the 2004 crisis mainly resulted in the drain of liquidity, while in 1998
the latter combined with serious solvency problems.
In between the two crises the interbank market has considerably grown and gained importance
as a source of funding for Russian banks. Figure 5.1 shows that both the number and the
ination-adjusted volume of domestic transactions more than doubled since January 1999, the
point when interbank market stability hindered by the 1998 turmoil was already largely restored.
The number of market participants rose from about 650 in January 1999, a half of all existing
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banks at that time, to well above 900, representing three quarters of all banks in May 2004.
The average Russian bank has been a net borrower on the interbank market with a growing net
liability position. While the average share of interbank claims in total assets remained relatively
constant around 5-6%, the average share of interbank obligations rose from about 6% in 1999 to
8% in 2004. A rather opposite trend of declining interbank market involvement took place for
the 40 biggest banks. Their average share of interbank obligations in total assets fell from 25%
in 1999 to 10% in 2001 and remained around that level till 2004. The corresponding share of
interbank claims decreased from 10-12% in 1999-2001 to 7-9% in 2002-2004. Thus, while big
banks on average reduced their reliance on the interbank market as a net source of funding, small
banks enhanced it.
The growing number of market participants and the easier access of small banks to the
interbank market show up in a decreasing market concentration as demonstrated by Figure 5.3.
The volume of transactions between the top 40 lenders and the top 40 borrowers accounted for
more than 80% of system-wide interbank claims in 1999 but diminished to less than 40% by May
2004. The other three lines representing total gross claims of top lenders on non-top borrowers
and of non-top lenders on both groups of borrowers display the opposite increasing trend. Figure
5.3 provides further evidence that in periods of turmoil primarily small banks are left aside. The
resulting rise in market concentration is evident for both the post-1998 crisis period and the
turbulent summer of 2004.
Top lenders and top debtors are likely to contribute most to contagion. Defaulting top debtors
deliver major credit losses and infect many other banks while top lenders are potentially the most
dangerous panic makers having claims, and hence the ability to run, on numerous counterparties.
Figure 5.4 focuses on the top debtors and top lenders' ability to spread contagion to the rest of the
system. In each month we sort banks by one of the four indicators: their share in system-wide
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Figure 5.3: Global Domestic Exposures
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interbank claims (valued outdegree), their share in system-wide interbank liabilities (valued
indegree), the percentage of market participants they have as counterparties on their asset side
(non-valued outdegree) and similarly for the liability side (non-valued indegree). In the social
network terminology these four indicators are examples of the so called centrality indices. Each
measure considers transactions between domestic banks only. We (arbitrarily choose to) keep the
biggest forty values of each indicator and take the average across them. We nally plot those
averages over time.
Two opposite trends are evident from Figure 5.4. While the valued indices decreased over
time, the non-valued ones noticeably rose. Banks with the biggest interbank obligations (valued
indegree) could in case of default on average deliver a credit loss of 2-2,5% of the total interbank
market volume in 1998-1999 but only 1-1,5% in 2004. Similarly banks with the biggest interbank
claims (valued outdegree) could on average withdraw 2-2,5% of the total interbank market volume
from their counterparties in 1998-1999 but only 1-1,5% in 2004. On the other hand, banks with
the biggest number of counterparties on their liability side (non-valued indegree) could in case
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Figure 5.4: Market Concentration and Contagion
1
2
3
4
5
To
p-
40
 B
an
ks
 A
ve
ra
ge
, %
Jul 98 Jan 00 Jul 01 Jan 03 Jul 04
Valued Outdegree Valued Indegree
Non-valued Outdegree Non-valued Indegree
of default on average spread contagion to 2-3% of all the market participants in 1998-1999 but
to almost double so much in 2004. Banks with the biggest number of counterparties on their
asset side (non-valued outdegree) could run on 1-2% of the market participants in 1998-1999 and
again on almost double so much in 2004. Overall these gures suggest that while the magnitude
of potential shocks has diminished over time, the risk of being hit by a shock has grown. This
observation is in line with the decreasing market concentration detected in Figure 5.3. More links
between banks imply that losses are absorbed by a larger number of counterparties but also that
more banks get infected.
A few of the biggest Russian banks have ensured that the total volume of transactions with
foreign counterparties has always exceeded the total volume of domestic transactions, both in
terms of borrowing and lending, although only by a small margin during the second half of our
sample period. For an average bank, however, less than 20% of interbank activities involve a
foreign counterparty. Thus, the major contribution of foreign banks to our contagion exercise
relates to their powerful ability to run on big domestic banks.
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Few Russian banks have permanent relationships with other banks. Considering only the
bilateral links that show activity in at least one period, only 25% of the bilateral links are active
in more than one third of the observed periods, while only 12% of the bilateral links are active in
more than a half of the observed periods. Such an unstable market structure no doubt adds to the
variability of contagion risk over time.
5.3 Baseline simulations
The following matrix summarizes the types of data used in our exercise:
L =
0BB@
0 y12 y13 y14
y21 0 y23 y24
y31 y32 0 y34
y41 y42 y43 0
1CCA
c1
c2
c3
c4
l1
l2
l3
l4
where L is the matrix of interbank exposures with yij representing gross claims of bank i on
bank j. Banks don't lend to themselves, hence yij = 0 if i = j. ci and li are, respectively, bank's i
capital and liquid assets (cash + reserves). The net exposure (NE) on the interbank market can be
computed for bank i as NEi =
Pn
j=1 yji  
Pn
j=1 yij . If NEi > 0, bank i is a net borrower on the
interbank market, otherwise it is a net creditor.
The anatomy of a crisis is determined by the initial shock (rst-round defaults) and the
propagation mechanism (further rounds of contagious defaults). In the baseline simulations we
model the initial shock as a sudden single bank's default on its interbank obligations (idiosyncratic
shock). Each remaining bank suffers a credit loss equal to its total gross claims on the rst-round
domino.49
Capital channel of contagion assumes credit losses deplete bank capital. If losses exceed
capital an institution turns insolvent and, in turn, defaults on its own interbank obligations. In case
such second-round defaults occur the associated credit losses further deplete the surviving banks'
capital and possibly lead to further rounds of insolvencies. Formally, in each round of contagion
49 The assumption that a bank loses its total gross claims on the defaulting institution is consistent with the evidence on
actual recovery rates. The CBR reports that only 3% of interbank claims on failed institutions were recovered in the
process of bank liquidation in the period 2001-2003 (Vedomosti, 2003, N 121 (921) ). In other words, loss given
default on interbank claims was almost 100%.
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the following rule determines defaulting institutions:
Capital channel ('passive banks' scenario):
di =
0 if
PN
j=1 y
f
ij  ci
1 if
PN
j=1 y
f
ij > ci
where yfij are claims of bank i on failed bank j and di is a default indicator with di = 1 for
failed banks. In this manner contagion propagates through the system until no more failures occur.
Capital channel is indiscriminate as it assumes all insolvent banks are forced into immediate
bankruptcy. We call simulations of this purely mechanical capital channel the 'passive banks'
scenario.
Liquidity channel of contagion assumes credit losses trigger runs on infected banks. When one
bank experiences an adverse shock, uncertainty is created about other banks potentially subject
to the same shock. Many of the interbank market participants are risk averse and would rather
be safe than sorry. In periods of uncertainty and mutual suspicion they might overreact to any
negative news and run on potentially infected institutions by not prolonging outstanding credits
and withdrawing funds on current accounts. Banks, exposed to a run but having insufcient liquid
assets to cover their net interbank exposure, fail.50 In case such second-round failures occur the
associated credit losses trigger new runs and possibly lead to further rounds of failures. Formally,
in each round of contagion the following rule determines defaulting institutions:
Liquidity channel:51
di =
0 if uninfected or NEi  li
1 if infected and NEi > li
Note that liquidity channel does discriminate between infected and uninfected banks. We
consider two denitions of infected banks. The rst assumes a panic-like environment with
the initial shock destroying all trust in the banking system, in effect, contaminating all banks.
50 Virtually all interbank lending in Russia is overnight or very short-term (up to a week). It is thus reasonable to assume
that over a short time span all interbank deposits/loans can be withdrawn/not renewed.
51 Because the denition of illiquid bank considers net interbank exposure, the simulated bank defaults due to liquidity
problems are invariant to whether we explicitly allow for the bilateral setoff - netting - of interbank positions or not.
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Simulations of what we call a 'panic' scenario combine both channels of contagion with this rst
treatment of all banks as infected. The following rule determines defaulting institutions in each
round of contagion:
Both channels ('panic' scenario):
di =
0 if
PN
j=1 y
f
ij  ci and NEi  li
1 if
PN
j=1 y
f
ij > ci or NEi > li
Our second denition assumes that market participants distinguish between illiquid banks in
trouble (suffering credit losses) and illiquid banks showing no signs of trouble, and only run on
the former. Banks that are exposed to credit losses therefore fail because of 1) the direct impact
of the credit loss (the capital channel) and 2) the indirect impact on the exposed bank's liquidity
driven by other banks' reactions on its credit loss (the liquidity channel). Simulations of what we
call an 'active banks' scenario combine both channels of contagion with this second denition of
infected banks. The following rule determines defaulting institutions in each round of contagion:
Both channels ('active banks' scenario):
di =
0 if
PN
j=1 y
f
ij  ci and (NEi  li or
PN
j=1 y
f
ij = 0)
1 if
PN
j=1 y
f
ij > ci or (NEi > li and
PN
j=1 y
f
ij > 0)
Note that the 'active banks' default rule delivers at least the same contagious defaults as the
'passive banks' rule and possibly more. The 'panic' scenario (hence, the name) delivers maximum
contagion.
When computing a bank's net interbank exposure we take into account claims on and debts
to only non-failed banks. Here we assume, rst, that defaulting institutions do not honour any
of their obligations and, second, that all other banks will postpone paying their debts to these
institutions. The latter assumption is plausible in the short run because troubled banks are not
strong enough to collect these payments quickly. By the time the temporary administration,
appointed by the judge, has built the list of creditors and borrowers and has started to clean up
the mess, the banking crisis has already run its course. Note that this assumption of postponed
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Figure 5.5: Contagion in Alternative Scenarios
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debt repayment makes the remaining banks more liquid ceteris paribus. It is therefore a very
conservative assumption that makes sure we do not overstate the severity of a crisis.
Throughout the simulations we never allow foreign banks to fail, but we do allow foreign
banks to run on domestic banks, i.e. claims on and debts to foreign banks enter the calculation
of domestic banks' net interbank exposure. The two CBR-owned banks, Sberbank and
Vneshtorgbank, known to have enjoyed the full and consistent backing of the CBR, are not
allowed to fail. In each month we compute system-wide assets by summing up assets of all banks
having an open interbank position, excluding Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank.
In each period we let every bank perform the role of the exogenously failing initial domino,
track the resulting contagion effects as dened above, and compute the share of failed assets in
system-wide assets, excluding the initial domino. For each month for each initially failed bank we
get 3 estimates of contagion corresponding to the three scenarios: 'passive banks', 'active banks'
and 'panic'. For each month and scenario we then compute the average across the 5% worst
estimates of contagion. Figure 5.5 plots those averages for each of the three scenarios over time.
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Using the single solvency condition for tracking bank failures proves sufcient to capture the
post-1998 crisis period when solvency problems were indeed a major issue for many banks. We
nd that across the 5% worst-case simulations the average share of system-wide bank assets failed
due to contagion in the 'passive banks' scenario uctuates around 10% following the crisis of
August 1998 and gradually declines to negligible levels by 2000. This share remains virtually
zero from then onwards, showing no signs of trouble even around the summer of 2004.
Allowing banks to run on each other not only increases the size of contagion but, importantly,
also points out the system's intrinsic instability in both 1998 and 2004. Indeed the estimate
of contagion, provided by the simulations of the 'active banks' scenario, declines from 50% in
September 1998 to about 10% by 2000, stays at low levels till end 2003 and then rises again to
a peak of 40% in July 2004. The simulations of the 'panic' scenario exhibit similar dynamics,
but larger levels of contagion in every period. Given the estimated system's intrinsic instability
in 2004 it is, with hindsight, not so surprising that the license withdrawal from a medium-sized
bank and rumors that more banks would follow sufced to trigger a systemic crisis. Clearly the
liquidity channel of contagion, incorporated in the active banks scenario and the panic scenario,
contributes to our understanding of real life systemic crises on the interbank market.
5.4 Alternative Initial Shock
In the baseline simulations we model the rst-round shock as an exogenous failure of a single
bank. This approach implicitly treats all banks as equally likely to fail in the rst round. It further
restricts the scope of the initial shock to a failure of only one institution.
In this section we relax the above mentioned restrictions and model the initial shock as
a joint default of several banks (systemic shock). Initial dominoes are determined randomly
on the basis of banks' individual failure probabilities. The latter, in turn, are assumed to be
driven by individual bank characteristics (unconditional part) as well as by macroeconomic
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Table 5.1: Regressors in Failure Prediction Model
Regressor Measure of Expected Sign
Net Income / Assets Protability -
Capital / Assets Solvency risk -
Reserves / Assets Liquidity risk -
Treasury Bonds / Assets Liquidity risk -
Loans to Non-banks / Assets Credit risk -
Bad Loans / Assets Credit risk +
Non-bank Deposits / Assets Funding costs -
State Deposits / Assets Funding costs -
Log (Assets) Systemic importance -
Bank Deposits / Assets Systemic importance -
environment. The unconditional part is derived as a tted probability from a probit model,52 while
macroeconomic environment is modelled as a random realization of a common risk factor. Such
treatment is consistent with a one-factor version of the CreditRisk+ model (see Gordy (2002) for
a general presentation of the CR+ model).53 Given that other credit risk models like KMV or
CreditMetrics require banks to be listed or to have credit ratings, conditions not fullled for most
Russian banks, CreditRisk+ is the best available alternative to simulate bank defaults.
5.4.1 Unconditional Default Probabilities
Using a panel of all Russian banks for the period August 1998 - November 2004 we run probit
regressions of a binary variable equal to one in the month of a bank's license withdrawal on a
list of bank specic variables.54 Table 5.1 reports the list of right-hand side variables and their
expected effect on the failure probability. All these variables have already been successfully
employed in bank failure prediction models for Russian banks (see Golovan et al., 2003, Lanine
and Vander Vennet, 2006).
Net income to total assets proxies bank's protability and is expected to negatively affect its
probability of failure. Capital serves as a buffer against losses, hence, higher capital to assets ratio
52 Hamerle and Rösch (2004) advocate probit models for parameterizing CR+.
53 We draw inspiration from Elsinger et al. (2006) who study contagion in the Austrian banking system and use
CreditRisk+ to model business cycle effects on average industry defaults.
54 Limiting bank failures to true bankrupties, thus, discarding licence revokals due to mergers and compulsory/voluntary
liquidation, does not produce substantially different failure predictions and is not considered in the paper. Introducing
bank-specic effects into the probit model doesn't signicantly alter the results either.
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should result in a lower probability of default.
Highly liquid banks should be more capable of accommodating unexpected deposit
withdrawals. Thus, we expect a higher share of reserves in total assets to be associated with lower
default probabilities. Although government bonds are generally considered as risk-free secondary
reserves, the government default on its debt in August 1998 severely hit many Russian banks
and brought them on the edge of bankruptcy. Thus, the sign for the second measure of liquidity,
treasury bonds divided by total assets, is not a priori clear.
A high share of bad loans in total assets indicates poor credit quality and is expected to increase
the probability of failure. A high share of loans to non-banks in total assets could either signal
greater exposure to credit risk or indicate a greater predisposition to engage in more traditional
and, perhaps, less speculative activities. The expected sign of this latter variable, therefore, is not
clear.
Two cheapest sources of funding are non-bank deposits and state deposits. Thus, we expect
a higher share of either deposit type in total assets to be associated with lower funding costs
and, therefore, with lower default probabilities. Moreover, the CBR may be reluctant to revoke
licenses from banks that are heavily involved in channelling budget funds, providing an additional
rationale for including the share of state deposits in the failure model.
Money centre banks borrowing a lot on the interbank market and big banks represent a threat
to the systemic stability, and the CBR might be reluctant to withdraw their licenses. Thus, the
share of bank deposits in total assets and the log of assets are both expected to negatively affect
the probability of failure.
Results of the basic probit regression are reported in the rst column of table 5.2. Most
coefcients are signicant with the expected signs. Higher protability, capitalization, liquidity in
the form of cash or investment into government securities, better loan quality and extensive use of
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cheap budget and deposit funding reduce the probability of default. Involvement into traditional
banking activities such as granting loans signals less speculation and less risks. Money centre
banks borrowing a lot on the interbank market and big banks represent a threat to the systemic
stability and are unlikely to lose their license.
For each period we compute each bank's unconditional default probability as a tted
probability from the probit regression. As individual bank characteristics vary over time, so do
their unconditional default probabilities.
5.4.2 Simulations with Systemic Shock
We assume that banks' actual default probabilities equal their unconditional default
probabilities multiplied by a random common risk factor x.55 The latter is a gamma distributed
variable with mean one and variance one as suggested for one-factor models in the CR+ manual,
Section A7.3. The common factor serves as a scaling factor. For x > 1 all individual default
probabilities increase above their unconditional counterparts; for x < 1 all default probabilities
fall. This approach captures the typical business cycle effects on average bank defaults: default
rates increase in recessions and decrease in booms. Thus, random realizations of x correspond to
different states of macroeconomic environment: x > 1 to bad times, x < 1 to good times.
We simulate one set of 1000 random realizations of the common factor x. For each period and
each scenario these 1000 values of x result in 1000 initial shocks, and, thus, 1000 simulations of
contagion. In each simulation initial dominoes are determined by random Bernoulli draws with
the success probability for each bank equal to its rescaled default probability (i.e. unconditional
default probability times the common factor realization). The propagation of the shock follows the
same basic rules outlined for the baseline simulations. In each month for each of the 1000 initial
shocks we get 3 estimates of contagion corresponding to the three scenarios: 'passive banks',
55 Lesko et al. (2004) show that, though the single risk factor approach overestimates the portfolio risk, the
overestimation error is small if it is applied to rms operating in one country.
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Figure 5.6: Contagion with Alternative Shocks
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'active banks' and 'panic'. For each month and scenario we then compute the average across 50
(= 5%*1000) worst estimates of contagion.
Our estimates of contagion turn out to be robust to the denition of the shock. Figure 5.6
reports one example for the 'active banks' scenario. Results for other scenarios paint the same
picture and are available from the authors on request.
5.5 Empirical Relevance
5.5.1 Actual Bank Defaults
We have already shown that our simulations correctly identify periods of intrinsic instability on
a system level. Can they also contribute to our understanding of individual bank failures?
We dene a bank's exposure to contagion risk as a percentage of simulations in which a
bank fails due to contagion. For each bank in each month we compute four versions of this risk
measure corresponding to the different combinations of initial shock and scenario assumed in the
simulations: 'active banks' with idiosyncratic shock (AB-IS), 'active banks' with systemic shock
(AB-SS), 'panic' with idiosyncratic shock (P-IS) and 'panic' with systemic shock (P-SS).
We add those measures of contagion risk sequentially to the basic failure prediction model.
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Table 5.2: Failure Prediction Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Basic Basic AB-IS AB-SS P-IS P-SS
Net Income -0.93*** -1.25** -1.26** -1.17** -1.25** -1.28**
Capital -0.77*** -0.92*** -0.93*** -0.92*** -0.72*** -0.69***
Reserves -2.26*** -2.10*** -2.06*** -2.06*** -1.41*** -1.39***
Treasury Bonds -1.85*** -3.81*** -3.89*** -4.04*** -3.85*** -4.06***
Loans to Non-Banks -0.95*** -1.18*** -1.19*** -1.19*** -1.17*** -1.16***
Bad Loans 0.88*** 1.56*** 1.56*** 1.55*** 1.34*** 1.22***
Non-bank Deposits -0.90*** -0.74** -0.74** -0.73** -0.52* -0.48
Size -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.06***
State Deposits -0.40 -0.76 -0.74 -0.74 -0.66 -0.74
Bank Deposits -0.43** -0.78** -0.87** -0.88*** -1.42*** -1.43***
Contagion Risk (AB-IS) 1.70*
Contagion Risk (AB-SS) 1.80***
Contagion Risk (P-IS) 0.50***
Contagion Risk (P-SS) 0.85***
Observations 100086 52457 52457 52457 52457 52457
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26
Note: The table reports probit regressions of the binary variable equal to one in the month of a bank's licence revokal on a
list of bank-specic variables. Data is monthly for August 1998 - November 2004. Column 1 reports results for the panel
of all Russian banks. Columns 2-6 report results for the panel of banks active on the interbank market. Size is the log of
assets. Contagion risk is the percentage of simulations, in which a bank fails due to domino-effects. Other explanatory
variables are rescaled by total assets. Constants are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns 3-6 of Table 5.2 report the results for the sample of banks active on the interbank market.
To facilitate comparison we also reestimate the basic model for this constrained sample of banks
and report the results in column 2.
Bank fundamentals show up consistently with expected signs. Remarkably, our measures
of contagion risk are always positive and signicant indicating that banks, often failing in our
simulations, do fail in reality.56 The statistical signicance of those measures survives the presence
of an extensive list of bank fundamentals, suggesting they truly capture some exposure to systemic
risk, not easily derived from bank balance sheets alone.
5.5.2 Actual Runs on Interbank Market
Liquidity channel of contagion relies on the assumption that in times of uncertainty and mutual
suspicion interbank market participants run on each other. How relevant is this assumption?
In a recent paper Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) model a core-periphery structure of the
56 If we take the average reported coefcient on contagion risk in columns 3-6 to be roughly 1, then an increase in the
percentage of simulations in which a bank fails due to contagion by 1% would increase the odds of failure by 1%.
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interbank market. In their model when default probabilities are high safe banks (the core) try to
limit their exposure to systemic risk by disconnecting from risky banks (the periphery). Such
disconnection results in a ight to quality and a higher market concentration as only safe units
remain connected.
This idea seems very relevant for the Russian interbank market, which is known to have a tier
structure. The top tier (the core) consists of about 40 biggest banks57 and accounts for the bulk
of interbank lending. Those top-tier banks are generally perceived as relatively safe as reected
in their lower cost of borrowing on the interbank market. All other banks (the periphery) are
generally viewed as risky, pay higher interest rates and are particularly exposed to runs in times
of distress. Figure 5.3 has already shown evidence of rising market concentration in both 1998
and 2004 consistent with the idea that in turbulent times the core tries to disconnect from the
periphery. We now provide some econometric-based evidence for this `run to quality' assumption.
If the perception of higher systemic instability causes safe units to disconnect from the risky
ones, then the moves in our measure of systemic distress should precede changes in market
concentration. We test this idea by running Granger causality regressions. Our measure of market
concentration is the volume of transactions between the top 40 lenders and the top 40 borrowers
depicted in Figure 5.3. Our measure of systemic distress is depicted in Figure 5.5 under the `active
banks' scenario. Granger causality regressions include two lags of each variable and a time trend.
We leave the rst six months following the 1998 crisis out of our sample. In those months the
interbank market was almost non-existent and excessive volatility of our systemic risk measure
might distort the results.
We nd that our measure of contagion risk Granger causes market concentration at the 1% level
but not vice versa (results available on request). This evidence is consistent with the predictions
57 Examples include Vnesheconombank, Sberbank, Gasprombank, Rosbank, Bank of Moscow, MDM, MMB,
Petrocommerts, Surgutneftegasbank, Transcreditbank, Alfa Bank, Bank Zenit and several foreign-owned banks such
as ING Bank and Raiffeisen Bank.
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of Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) and with the assumptions underlying our liquidity channel of
contagion. The perception of higher systemic instability induces the core to disconnect from the
periphery. This result is robust to using different measures of contagion (`active banks' scenario
versus `panic' scenario). It is also robust to supplementing regressions with controls for aggregate
bank health, like average capitalization and average liquidity shown in Figure 5.2.
5.6 Lender of Last Resort
In what follows we focus on the 'active banks' scenario. We study the effect of the Central
Bank's liquidity injections on systemic stability by constructing counterfactuals with respect to
CBR's behavior. In the construction of these counterfactuals we treat both CBR-owned banks,
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank, as integral parts of the broad CBR. The CBR has extensively used
both its daughters as a policy instrument, in particular encouraging them to provide liquidity to
smaller banks during the turbulent summer of 2004. Both banks have in turn enjoyed the full and
consistent backing of their parent.
Our rst 'real CBR' counterfactual allows Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank neither to fail nor
to run on other banks. This counterfactual essentially interprets all interbank loans of the two
CBR-owned banks as emergency liquidity injections. Compared to baseline simulations, this
restriction makes private banks less vulnerable to the liquidity channel of contagion, as they can
no longer be run on by the two CBR-owned banks.
We further simulate what would have happened in terms of contagion risk if the broad CBR
(including its daughters) would not have provided any emergency liquidity as a Lender of Last
Resort (LOLR). The simplest way to model this `absent CBR' counterfactual is to allow the
CBR (together with its daughters) to run on other banks. Such a run would deplete banks'
liquidity buffers by exactly the amount of any prior CBR lending, making them more vulnerable
to contagion. In these simulations Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank are no different from other banks,
and thus are allowed to both fail and run.
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In a third counterfactual we assess whether a 'hypothetical CBR' could have increased the
system's intrinsic stability by optimally redistributing the available liquidity among banks.
Technically, in each period we lower all banks' liquidity positions by their borrowings from the
broad CBR, essentially treating those borrowings as LOLR liquidity injections. We compute
the total monthly amount of these injections and redistribute them towards banks with the
biggest partial contributions to contagion. The latter are computed for each bank-month as an
average reduction in systemic risk caused by the exogenously imposed immunity of that bank to
contagion.58 Then we sort banks in a descending order by their average partial contribution to
contagion and redistribute liquidity. We increase the liquidity holdings of the bank ranked rst
to the amount sufcient to cover its all interbank obligations. In this manner we ensure that the
bank with the largest partial contribution to contagion never fails because of insufcient liquidity.
We do the same for banks ranked second, third etc. until the cumulative counterfactual liquidity
injection equals the total amount of broad CBR liquidity injections available in the respective
period. We then rerun the simulations with these adjusted liquidity positions. This procedure
basically amounts to optimizing the stability effect of the broad CBR's liquidity injections by
redistributing them to the banks of our choice, without manipulating the magnitude of liquidity
injection itself.
Limited data on CBR lending allows us to run the experiment for 27 out of total 75 periods:
quarterly for October 1998-October 2002 and monthly for February-November 2004. Because in
the `absent CBR' counterfactual Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank are allowed to fail, their assets are
also included in system-wide assets. That makes sure our measure of contagion is always bounded
between zero and one.
Figure 5.7 reports the results for the three counterfactuals with an idiosyncratic shock. The
58 Specically, in each simulation, sequentially for each contagiously failing bank, we impose its survival, rerun the
simulation, and compute by how much the share of contagiously failed assets drops relative to the original simulation.
These reductions in contagion are then averaged across simulations for each bank-month.
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Figure 5.7: Liquidity Redistribution Experiment
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results reveal that the CBR's liquidity injections contributed considerably to the mitigation of
systemic risk, specically in times of crisis. Our 'optimal' redistribution of liquidity could at
best have lead to a marginal improvement in the system's stability. Provided that we can inject
the same amount of liquidity as the broad CBR, we conclude that the Russian LOLR performed
well in distributing it to banks whose stability was most benecial to the stability of the system.
This lends support to the thesis that the liquidity injections of a LOLR can effectively mitigate
coordination failures on the interbank market (Rochet and Vives, 2004).
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we enrich the literature with a new transmission channel of contagion on
the interbank market, the liquidity channel. We apply this idea to the Russian banking sector
and nd that the liquidity channel contributes signicantly to our understanding of both actual
interbank market crises and individual bank defaults. The results corroborate the thesis that
prudential regulation at individual bank level is insufcient to prevent systemic crises, because this
approach neglects the potential of contagion. Especially bank-specic capital rules, no matter how
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sophisticated, will never sufce to prevent coordination failures on the interbank market, simply
because capital is not a very important variable in assessing the risk of contagion and systemic
meltdown. This is an important lesson in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, that appears to have
been essentially a worldwide 'panic' scenario kick-started by the initial correlated default of some
banks. In addition, our results clearly suggest that the liquidity injections of a classical LOLR can
effectively mitigate coordination failures on the interbank market not only in theory, but also in
practice. In short: liquidity matters.
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